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*943 I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 After Japan bombed Pearl Harbor, the United States government 
initiated a series of policies to restrict the freedom of over 100,000 
American citizens of Japanese ancestry living on the West Coast. These 
policies were carried out under the combined authority of the President, the 
Secretary of War, military officials, Congress, and the War Relocation 
Authority (an agency of the Department of the Interior).1 Eventually, 
Japanese-American citizens were incarcerated indefinitely in camps guarded 
by military police. The Supreme Court, in a series of decisions--the most 
famous being Korematsu v. United States2--upheld these acts, under the 
"most rigid scrutiny,"3 as permissible exercises of power within the bounds 
of the United States Constitution. How could a vigilant judiciary permit 
such an abuse of power, such an infringement on individual rights? 
 Few in the legal academy would come to the defense of the Japanese 
internment cases. Indeed, the United States government later recognized the 
profound mistake it made when it interned the Japanese.4 Korematsu is often 
easily dismissed as a judicial mistake, a constitutional anomaly created out 
of the passions of wartime. However, the jurisprudential underpinning of the 
opinion--the deferential method of judicial review--is still quite prevalent in 
current constitutional law. In an increasing number of contexts, the Court 
articulates the rhetoric of what I will call the "deference principle": that the 
Court should not attempt to "second-guess" or "substitute" its judgment for 
the judgment of another decisionmaker or pass on the "wisdom" of a policy 
or law. 
 Deference is a type of judicial self-restraint, an approach to 
constitutional interpretation exemplified by Justice Frankfurter, Judge 
Learned Hand, and Professor James B. Thayer.5 Ronald *944 Dworkin 
                         
1 See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases--A Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 
489, 492-502 (1945) (describing the developments leading up to, and including, the 
Japanese internment). 
2 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
3 Id. at 216. 
4 See PERSONAL JUSTICE DENIED: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON WARTIME 
RELOCATION AND INTERNMENT OF CIVILIANS (1982). 
5 Deference is sometimes used interchangeably with the term "judicial 
self-restraint." Judicial self-restraint is a broad term encompassing many distinct 
judicial practices. For example, Alexander Bickel, one of the chief proponents of 
judicial restraint, did not advocate deference. In his book The Least Dangerous 
Branch, Bickel suggested an uncompromising judicial review-- with the caveat that 
it be used very sparingly. See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS 
BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962). Judicial restraint 
has been identified with several judicial practices, including a focus on principles 
rather than ideology or results, a respect for precedent, and avoidance of political 
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defines deference as a form of judicial restraint in which "political 
institutions other than courts are responsible for deciding which rights are to 
be recognized."6 Judge Posner defines the deferential judge as one who "is 
cautious and circumspect, and thus hesitant about intruding [her own views 
of policy]."7 
 Deference is the current method by which the Court exercises judicial 
review when examining decisions made in connection with what this Article 
terms the "bureaucratic state." The bureaucratic state consists of the web of 
interacting public and private institutions that regulate numerous facets of 
modern life. By "institutions," I am referring to large organizations with 
hierarchical structures of specialized functions. In the modern state, 
government power affecting rights is exercised increasingly by various 
institutions (schools, prisons, agencies, hospitals, workplaces) and by 
government experts and professionals. The Court frequently accords 
deference to the judgments of numerous decisionmakers in the bureaucratic 
state: Congress, the Executive, state legislatures, agencies, military officials, 
prison officials, professionals, prosecutors, employers, and practically any 
other decisionmaker in a position of authority or expertise. The scope of 
deference is staggering, and the areas within its dominion often affect 
fundamental constitutional rights such as freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, and equal protection. 
 Deference has placed its imprimatur upon modern constitutional 
jurisprudence. Deference has such profound effects that the incantation of its 
rhetoric becomes a climactic moment in a judicial opinion. Critics of 
deference have complained that it distorts the balancing of rights and 
governmental interests. In the military context, commentators have 
characterized deference as placing a "thumb-on-the-scale"8 or as "de facto 
non- justiciability."9 As Justice *945 Blackmun observed with regard to the 
prisons, courts can "substitute the rhetoric of judicial deference for 
meaningful scrutiny of constitutional claims."10 Justices and commentators 
have criticized deference as being a collection of "hollow shibboleths,"11 
                                                          
questions. See Daniel Novak, Economic Activism and Restraint, in SUPREME 
COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 77 (Stephen C. Halpern & Charles M. Lamb 
eds., 1982). 
6 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 138 (1978) [hereinafter Dworkin, 
Taking Rights Seriously]. 
7 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS 314 (1996). 
8 Seth Harris, Permitting Prejudice to Govern: Equal Protection, Military 
Deference, and the Exclusion of Lesbians and Gay Men from the Military, 17 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 171, 208 (1990). 
9 C. Thomas Dienes, When the First Amendment Is Not Preferred: The Military and 
Other “Special Contexts,” 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 779, 819 (1988). 
10 Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 593 (1984) (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
11 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 112 (1981) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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"seductively broad,"12 mechanically applied,13 and inconsistently 
practiced.14  
 Surprisingly, while deference has been examined in various contexts, it 
has never been analyzed in depth as a fundamental issue for constitutional 
jurisprudence.15 Much of the literature about deference concerns the 
deference given by the courts to the legal interpretations of agencies.16 A 
few articles examine the role of deference in specific contexts, such as 
prisons and the military.17 For the most part, however, theorists of judicial 
review have failed to explore deference conceptually. Despite the profound 
effects and the wide scope of deference in modern judicial review, the 
concept of deference remains malleable, indeterminate, and not 
well-defined.18 Critiques of deference have remained relatively superficial, 
often dismissing deference as a mere tool wielded by ideological judges to 
achieve a particular political result. Unfortunately, critics of deference have 
failed to adequately address deference at the level of its *946 conceptual 
underpinnings. As a result, deference has yet to be addressed in its full 
complexity, and it continues to be practiced with an alarming frequency in 
cases involving fundamental constitutional rights. 
                         
12 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 369 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
13 See Earl Warren, The Bill of Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 197 
(1962); Kelly E. Henriksen, Note, Gays, the Military, and Judicial Deference: 
When the Courts Must Reclaim Equal Protection as Their Area of Expertise, 9 
ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 1273, 1280 (1996). 
14 See Barney F. Bilello, Note, Judicial Review and Soldiers' Rights: Is the 
Principle of Deference a Standard of Review?, 17 HOFSTRA L. REV. 465, 467 
(1980). 
15 Discussions of deference have surfaced primarily in debates concerning 
deference to administrative agencies, especially after the seminal case of Chevron, 
U.S.A. Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron 
only constitutes a small part of the vast geography of deference. The issue that I am 
concerned about in this Article is the interaction between deference and 
constitutional rights. 
16 See generally Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation 
and Lawmaking Under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. 187 (1992); John F. Manning, 
Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations of 
Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 621 (1996); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial 
Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969 (1992). 
17 On deference and the military, see Dienes, surpa note 9; John Nelson Ohlweiler, 
The Principle of Deference: Facial Constitutional Challenges to Military 
Regulations, 10 J.L. & POL. 147 (1993); Bilello, surpa note 14. On deference and 
prisons, see Daniel J. Solove, Note, Faith Profaned: The Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act and Religion in the Prisons, 106 YALE L.J. 459 (1996). 
18 Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1983). 
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 This Article analyzes the conceptual underpinnings for deference.19 
Deference has a strong conceptual foundation rooted in the long-accepted 
principle that the judiciary must avoid doing what was done in Lochner--the 
substitution of judicial judgment for that of the policymaker or legislature. I 
argue that deference is a misguided attempt to carry out this principle in 
practice rooted in an impoverished conception of how the judiciary and 
government institutions evaluate empirical and factual evidence. As a result, 
deference often serves as an unjustified judicial stamp of legitimacy for the 
decisions made by government officials and bureaucrats. 
 Part II presents an overview of deference: its meaning in practice, its 
scope, and its effects on constitutional rights. Deference is the practice of 
accepting, without much questioning or skepticism, the factual and 
empirical judgments made by the decisionmaker under review. I argue that 
the domination of deference in the context of modern institutions poses a 
great threat for liberalism because of the rapid growth and expansion in 
power of the bureaucratic state. The constitutional rights of a growing 
number of citizens are dependent upon institutions and officials subject only 
to deferential review. Liberal theories of judicial review not only fail to 
account for the growing impact of the bureaucratic state on central liberal 
values, but also do not adequately confront the conceptual issues and 
practical concerns that serve to justify the practice of deference. 
 Part III sketches a genealogy of deference, illustrating how the practice 
of accepting, without criticism, the factual and empirical judgments made by 
the decisionmaker under review became associated with the deference 
principle. Under the prevailing view, the deference principle was originally 
articulated in Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York,20 and 
adopted by the Supreme Court nearly thirty years later at the end of the 
Lochner era. I claim, however, that the deference principle existed long 
before the Lochner *947 era. The critical issue during the Lochner era was 
not the existence or the even the validity of the deference principle, but the 
way in which the judiciary was to embody the principle in practice. It was 
the Court's difficulties in grappling with the complex relationship between 
facts and law that led to the formation of the current practice of deference. 
 Finally, Part IV critiques the current practice of deference. I argue that 
the practice associated with the deference principle is not the inherent 
embodiment of its meaning. The practice of deference is legitimated by a set 
                         
19 I have limited my inquiry to opinions explicitly implicating fundamental 
constitutional rights, for this is where deference is at its most problematic. 
Deference occurs in a variety of other contexts, and its rhetoric and practice are 
quite similar across these various contexts. I will touch upon these other contexts 
only when necessary to illuminate the deferential review in cases involving 
fundamental rights. 
20  198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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of interrelated justifications which concern the practicalities of the judiciary 
evaluating factual and empirical evidence. This set of legitimating 
justifications rests upon a particular conception of the judiciary, the 
adjudicatory process, and government institutions. I provide a detailed 
critique of this conception and argue why the practice of deference should 
be abandoned. 
 
II. THE PROBLEM OF DEFERENCE 
 
A. THE DEFERENCE PRINCIPLE AND ITS EMBODIMENT IN PRACTICE 
 
 It has become almost commonplace for the Court to declare that it will 
"defer to the expert judgment" of a government official,21 that it will not 
"interfere" with the "internal operations" of an institution,22 that it will not 
"substitute its judgment" for that of another decisionmaker,23 that it will not 
examine the "wisdom" of a regulation or law,24 that the matter is within the 
"professional expertise" of *948 another decisionmaker, or that the matter is 
within a government official's "domain," "province" or "discretion."25 This 
                         
21 E.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) ("[C]ourts should ordinarily 
defer to [prison officials'] expert judgment in such matters."). 
22 E.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 322 (1982) ("[I]nterference by the 
federal judiciary with the internal operations of [state medical] institutions should 
be minimized."). 
23 See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 
257, 278 (1989) ("It is not our role to review directly the award for excessiveness 
[of punitive damages], or to substitute our judgment for that of the jury."); Rostker 
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 68 (1981) (stating that the Court must "not substitute our 
judgment of what is desirable for that of Congress"); Citizens to Preserve Overton 
Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971) ("The court is not empowered to 
substitute its judgment for that of the agency."). 
24 See, e.g., Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319 (1993) ("[R]ational- basis review in 
equal protection analysis 'is not a license for courts to judge the wisdom, fairness, or 
logic of legislative choices"') (quoting FCC v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 
U.S. 307, 313 (1993)); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983) ("We begin, of 
course, with the presumption that the challenged statute is valid. Its wisdom is not 
the concern of the courts ...."); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147 (1983) ("[A] 
federal court is not the appropriate forum in which to review the wisdom of a 
personnel decision taken by a public agency allegedly in reaction to the employee's 
behavior."); Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 (1976) ( "It is 
not our function to appraise the wisdom of [the City of Detroit's] decision to require 
adult theatres to be separated rather than concentrated in the same areas."). 
25 See, e.g., Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources Council, 490 U.S. 360, 377 (1989) 
("[W]e must defer to 'the informed discretion of the responsible federal agencies.") 
(citing Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 412 (1976)); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 
520, 547 n.29 (1979) ("[C]ourts should defer to the informed discretion of prison 
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rhetoric points to an overarching general principle--which I will refer to as 
"the deference principle"--that judges should not second-guess the 
decisionmaker under review or impose their own judgments about the 
wisdom of a policy. 
 Legal principles cannot be adequately understood in isolation, plucked 
from the feverish world in which they exist and studied like specimens 
preserved in glass jars. Principles have histories, and throughout their long 
pasts, they are often used in a panoply of contradictory ways. They evolve, 
change, and are weathered and tempered by their repeated use. Like other 
legal principles, the deference principle has a long history. It did not always 
exist in its current form but was part of a larger idea that became focused 
and honed during the death throes of the Lochner era. That larger idea is the 
longstanding distinction between law and policy: that legal and 
constitutional interpretation must remain untarnished by politics and 
ideology. The Framers constructed a written constitution based on the idea 
of the rule of law--"a government of laws and not of men."26 Written law 
must be interpreted and applied, and this necessity creates vexing problems 
for the rule of law. When judges insert their own personal politics into the 
interpretive process, the rule of law transforms into the rule of individuals. 
While the Constitution itself was a creation of politics, the rule of law 
dictates that the process of interpreting it must remain politically neutral.27 
The rule of law depends upon a strict dichotomy between the judicial and 
the political, between the realm of legal interpretation and the world of 
politics and policy. This dichotomy, however, readily dissolves. Alexander 
Hamilton recognized this problem when he observed *949 in Federalist No. 
78: 
 
The courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be disposed to 
exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would equally be the 
substitution of their pleasure to that of the legislative body. The observation, if 
it proved any thing, would prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from 
that body. 28  
 
Aware of the danger of judges turning into legislators, Hamilton asserted 
                                                          
administrators ...."); id. at 548 ("[T]he operation of our correctional facilities is 
peculiarly the province of the Legislative and Executive Branches of our 
Government, not the Judicial."); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974) 
(stating that courts defer to the judgment of officials on matters "peculiarly within 
the province and professional expertise of corrections officials"). 
26 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
27 See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870- 
1960, at 9 (1992). 
28 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 
1961). 
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that the solution was an independent judiciary, separate from the turbulent 
political world.29  
 Notwithstanding its virtues, judicial independence is only a structural 
aid, insulating judges from certain political pressures. It cannot cleanse 
judges of their ideologies. The task of maintaining the law-policy distinction 
falls upon the judiciary. "[T]he only check upon our own exercise of power 
is our own sense of self-restraint," Justice Stone once remarked, "For the 
removal of unwise laws from the statute book appeal lies, not to the courts, 
but to the ballot and to the processes of democratic government."30 With his 
cynical wit, Justice Holmes put it most bluntly: "I hope and believe that I am 
not influenced by my opinion that it is a foolish law .... [I]f my fellow 
citizens want to go to hell, I will help them. It's my job."31  
 The deference principle, a manifestation of the distinction between law 
and policy, became enshrined as the central principle of judicial review after 
the demise of the Lochner era. The Lochner era, a period of Supreme Court 
jurisprudence spanning from 1899 to 1937, has long been inscribed into 
constitutional legend.32 The legend characterizes the Lochner era as one of 
the darkest chapters in the saga of constitutional jurisprudence. During this 
time, the Court struck down numerous progressive laws involving economic 
and social welfare.33 In Lochner v. New York,34 the symbolic decision *950 
of the age, the Court struck down a New York statute that limited the 
amount of hours that a bakery employee could work to sixty per week, 
reasoning that the law interfered with the constitutional protection of liberty 
of contract. Although the state had the power to regulate to promote the 
public welfare, its statute exceeded the scope of the state's legislative power. 
During the ensuing years, the Court found numerous other progressive laws 
to be unconstitutional, including several important New Deal statutes during 
the 1930s.35 The Lochner era ended abruptly in 1937 when the Court began 
                         
29 Id. at 526-27. 
30 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting). 
31 Letter from Oliver W. Holmes to Harold J. Laski (Mar. 4, 1920), in 1 
HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS, 1916-1935, at 248-49 (Mark D. Howe ed., 1953). 
32 Several recent works of scholarship attempt to debunk many of the myths that 
persist about the Lochner era. See, e.g., BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW 
DEAL COURT (1998); Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought 
Experiments: The Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1891 (1994). 
33 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 8.2, at 567 (2d ed. 
1988). 
34 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
35 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587  (1936) 
(invalidating the New York minimum wage law for females); Ashton v. Cameron 
County Water Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (invalidating the Municipal Bankruptcy 
Act); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (holding the Bituminous Coal 
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consistently to uphold New Deal legislation.36  
 Today, Lochnerism is "universally acknowledged to have been 
constitutionally improper."37 Justice Holmes' famous dissent in *951 
Lochner has become the prevailing view of what the Court did wrong in 
Lochner. According to Holmes, the Court had struck down the law because 
it merely disagreed with it. "I strongly believe," Holmes asserted, "that my 
agreement or disagreement has nothing to do with the right of a majority to 
embody their opinions in law."38 Holmes declared that the Court had 
smuggled its own ideology into its interpretation of the Constitution: 
 
A constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, whether 
of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizens of the State or of laissez 
                                                          
Act of 1935 unconstitutional); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) 
(invalidating the Agricultural Adjustment Act); Hopkins Fed. Sav. & Loan v. 
Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935) (invalidating parts of the Home Owners Loan Act); 
Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Randford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (invalidating 
the Federal Farm Bankruptcy Act); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495 (1935) (invalidating a section of the NIRA as beyond congressional 
power); Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (invalidating the 
Railroad Retirement Pension Act as not within the powers of the Commerce 
Clause); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (ruling that the joint resolution 
is a direct violation of Section 4 of the Fourth Amendment); Panama Refining Co. 
v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (finding a section of the NIRA unconstitutional). 
36 The beginning of the demise of the Lochner era has been pinpointed to the 1937 
case of West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (reversing Adkins v. 
Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923)). This was followed by a series of other 
opinions upholding New Deal legislation. See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 
U.S. 100 (1941) (ruling that the Fair Labor Standards Act is a constitutional 
exercise of the Commerce Clause); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 659 (1937) 
(upholding provisions of the Social Security Act); Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 
U.S. 440 (1937) (holding unanimously that the second Federal Farm Bankruptcy 
Act, similar to the first one invalidated in Radford, was constitutional). The 
traditional legend has it that the Lochner era ended because the Court buckled under 
the pressure of Roosevelt's well-known Court-packing plan. However, as Barry 
Cushman points out in his excellent study on the New Deal Court, there were a 
flurry of proposals to weaken the Court's judicial review throughout the entire span 
of the Lochner era, none of which seemed to have much effect on the Court. The 
Court-packing plan was far from becoming a guaranteed success. CUSHMAN, supra 
note 32, at 12. Further, West Coast Hotel was actually voted on long before the 
Court-packing plan was known to the Court, and Chief Justice Hughes deliberately 
withheld its release to prevent "the false impression that the Court was capitulating 
to political pressure." Id. at 18; see also Michael Ariens, A Thrice-Told Tale, or 
Felix the Cat, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 620, 637 (1994); Friedman, supra note 32, at 
1949. 
37 John Hart Ely, Democracy And Distrust 14 (1980). 
38 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing views, and the accident 
of finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel and even shocking 
ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether statutes 
embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States.39  
 
The heart of Holmes' dissent was that the Lochner majority had confused 
law and policy, and it was this dissent, more than any other writing, that has 
become the canonical text of the Lochner legend. 
 During the New Deal and afterwards, liberals seized upon Holmes' 
dissent. Legal thought could have adopted a pragmatic conception of 
constitutional interpretation, viewing it as an activity shaped by historical 
context and the prevailing ideologies of the day. Under this view, the 
Lochner Court was wrong because it was out of touch with the practical 
consequences of laissez faire capitalism. Too focused on the past, the Court 
failed to develop a vision for the future that was responsive to the needs and 
realities of the times. The Court's problem was not that it was failing to be 
ideologically neutral; and the solution was not to try to cleanse the 
interpretative process of the influence of the justices' ideologies. Rather, the 
Court's guiding ideology was what had to change--from its rigid laissez faire 
viewpoint to a more progressive perspective. 
 However, proponents of New Deal liberalism chose not to fight the 
Lochner Court substantively. Instead, Liberals chose a procedural approach 
based upon Holmes' eloquent rhetoric of the deference principle. They 
argued that the problem with the Lochner Court was that it engaged in an 
improper method of judicial review; that the deference principle had always 
been a fundamental principle *952 of constitutional jurisprudence; that the 
Court had strayed from following the deference principle during the dark 
days of Lochnerism; and that, as Holmes had asserted, the Court had 
infected its interpretation of the Constitution with its own laissez faire 
ideology.40 Justice Black's famous eulogy of the Lochner era in Ferguson v. 
                         
39 Id. at 75-76 (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
40 See Morton J. Horwitz, The Warren Court and the Pursuit of Justice, 50 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 5, 6 (1993) ("The legal thinkers who justified the New Deal 
constitutional revolution after 1937 explained their triumph not as a constitutional 
revolution but as a restoration of neutral constitutional principles."). Professor 
Ackerman argues that post-New Deal jurisprudence views the Lochner Court as 
straying from preexisting principles of constitutional interpretation, established 
since the Marshall Court era. He dubs this view "the myth of rediscovery": 
    Modern lawyers are taught to dismiss as essentially worthless the interpretive 
effort of the Supreme Court during the long period of Republican ascendancy 
between 1869 and 1932 .... Only if the Old Court of the 1930's was completely 
wrong can the Rooseveltian Revolution be presented as merely requiring the 
Justices to rediscover the ancient wisdom of the Marshall Court. 
BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE I: FOUNDATIONS 62 (1991) [hereinafter 
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Skrupa, 41 best illustrates the prevailing view of the Lochner era: 
 
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner, Coppage, Adkins, Burns, and the like 
cases--that due process authorizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when 
they believe the legislature has acted unwisely--has long since been discarded. 
We have returned to the original constitutional proposition that courts do not 
substitute their social and economic beliefs for the judgment of legislative 
bodies, who are elected to pass laws.42  
 
The Ferguson Court was articulating the deference principle: that courts 
should not "substitute" their judgment for that of the legislature. Thus, post- 
New Deal liberalism hoisted up the deference principle, enshrining it as a 
hallmark principle of jurisprudence. 
 Today, the deference principle has become so widely accepted that its 
viability is rarely questioned. Indeed, few would claim that judges should 
intrude on the world of policy and exercise their judgment on the wisdom of 
laws. Of course, the legal realists did much to dissolve the tidy boundaries 
between law and politics, emphasizing the influence of personal ideology in 
interpretation.43 The realists were rather skeptical about whether a strict 
separation between *953 the judicial and legislative spheres of power could 
ever be achieved. Today, most in the legal academy agree with the realists; 
the statement that we are all legal realists now "has been made so frequently 
that it has become a truism to refer to it as a truism."44 Although most 
lawyers, judges, and scholars recognize that a strict separation of law and 
politics cannot be achieved in practice, the deference principle still prevails 
as one of the most powerful normative guideposts of the judicial function. 
 The interesting issue is how the judiciary has attempted to follow the 
deference principle--in other words, how the deference principle has been 
embodied in practice. The meaning of a legal principle cannot be adequately 
analyzed by looking only to the principle itself. The intricate interaction 
between a principle and its embodiment in practice most completely reveals 
all the shades and contours of its meaning. As with all general principles, the 
deference principle did not have a static meaning throughout history; the 
meaning of a principle often changes over time, sometimes even drifting to a 
meaning that is radically opposite to a previous one.45  
                                                          
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS]. 
41 372 U.S. 726 (1963). 
42 Id. at 730. 
43 E.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 118 (1935). 
44 LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, at 229 (1986). 
45 See J.M. Balkin, Ideological Drift and the Struggle Over Meaning, 25 CONN. L. 
REV. 869, 871 (1993) ("Ideological drift in law means that legal ideas and symbols 
will change their political valence as they are used over and over again in new 
contexts."). 
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 When courts recite the rhetoric of the deference principle--that they will 
not "second-guess" the judgment of a decisionmaker or will not pass on the 
"wisdom" of certain policies--they employ a specific practice of judicial 
review. The deference principle is not carried out by withdrawing certain 
cases from the scope of judicial review. Deference is not nonjusticiability; 
unlike political questions,46 when courts invoke the deference principle, they 
purport to engage in judicial review. The method of judicial review 
practiced involves the way courts evaluate the factual and empirical 
evidence underlying the law or policy at issue. Courts accept uncritically the 
factual and empirical evidence of the government supporting its laws and 
policies in a profound number of cases where the deference principle is 
invoked. 
 The practice of deference has drastic effects on the outcomes of cases 
because factual and empirical evidence plays an enormously *954 
influential role in the interpretation of the Constitution.47 During the latter 
part of this century, the Supreme Court engaged in a jurisprudence of 
balancing rights and interests when interpreting many provisions of the 
Constitution, especially the First and Fourteenth Amendments.48 Professor 
Aleinikoff quite appropriately dubbed modern constitutional law the "age of 
balancing."49 Balancing "analyzes a constitutional question by identifying 
interests implicated by the case and reaches a decision or constructs a rule of 
constitutional law by explicitly or implicitly assigning values to the 
identified interests."50  
 The most common form of balancing occurs through levels of judicial 
scrutiny.51 Each level of judicial scrutiny shares the same basic structure. 
First, the government interest must meet a threshold of importance: it must 
                         
46 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (holding that the Court will not 
consider an issue when there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional 
commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department," a "lack of judicially 
discoverable and manageable standards for resolving" the issue, or other factors 
relating to separation of powers). 
47 See John Monahan & Laurens Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluating, 
and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 477 (1988) 
("Once heretical, the belief that empirical studies can influence the content of legal 
doctrine is now one of the few points of general agreement among jurists."). For a 
series of examples of Supreme Court Justices using social science research in their 
opinions, see id. at 477 n.2. 
48 See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 
YALE L.J. 943, 943-44 (1987). 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 945. 
51 These formulas can be traced back to footnote four in United States v. Carolene 
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see infra Part III.A.4; see also Aleinikoff, 
supra note 48, at 963-72. 
THE DARKEST DOMAIN                                                                               
be "compelling" for strict scrutiny,52 "substantial" for intermediate 
scrutiny,53 or "legitimate" for minimal scrutiny.54 Second, the means of the 
law must be connected or tailored in some way to the governmental interest 
(the law's purpose or "end"): the least restrictive means, narrowly tailored, 
or reasonably related. The importance of the governmental interest and the 
tailoring of the means are the predicate to the government's exercise of 
power. 
 At its very foundations, judicial balancing is an approach to judicial 
review that emphasizes the importance of factual and empirical data. 
Balancing understands laws in an instrumental manner--*955 as means to 
achieve certain ends. Analysis of the government interest requires a 
valuation of the end that the law aims to achieve. Although this can certainly 
be viewed as an empirical question,55 rarely has the Court conducted an 
empirical valuation of the end in question. Instead, it is the way judicial 
balancing calls for the evaluation of the tailoring of the means that is 
unquestionably empirical. Determining how closely the means of the law are 
tailored to its end involves factual and empirical judgments, including 
determinations about the viability of the means, the effectiveness of the 
means, and the existence and effectiveness of alternative means. 
 In deference cases, the very minimal examination of factual and 
empirical evidence tends to override whatever level of scrutiny is applied, 
and is often dispositive. For example, in Clark v. Community for Creative 
                         
52 Sable Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126  (1989) (holding that a 
total ban on indecent dial-a-porn services was invalid under strict scrutiny). 
53 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968) (upholding the conviction of 
a defendant who burned a draft registration certificate in order to express anti-war 
beliefs). 
54 Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (holding that involuntary commitment of 
mentally retarded individuals did not violate equal protection or due process). 
55 John Dewey articulated an alternative approach to valuation that avoided the 
pitfalls of looking for some intrinsic or a priori value. See generally 13 JOHN 
DEWEY, Theory of Valuation, in THE LATER WORKS (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1991) 
(1939) [hereinafter DEWEY, Theory of Valuation]. Dewey criticized existing 
theories of valuation for failing "to make an empirical analysis of concrete desires 
and interests as they actually exist." Id. at 217. According to Dewey, ends were 
never fixed; they were merely "ends-in-view or aims," which were constantly 
subject to revision and change as the individual strove toward them. JOHN DEWEY, 
HUMAN NATURE AND CONDUCT 155 (Jo Ann Boydston ed., 1988) (1922) 
[hereinafter DEWEY, HUMAN NATURE]. "Ends are foreseen consequences which 
arise in the course of activity and which are employed to give activity added 
meaning and to direct its further course." Id. Ends guided present activity, 
preventing it from being "blind and disorderly" or "mechanical"; however, ends 
were never fixed. In the course of action, old ends were modified and new ends 
would come into being. Id. at 156, 159. 
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Non-Violence,56 a group of demonstrators planned to erect tents in Lafayette 
Park and sleep in them overnight to publicize the plight of the homeless. 
The National Park Service, which was responsible for managing the park, 
denied the group's request because of a regulation prohibited camping.57 The 
Court upheld the regulation as applied to the group, noting that the 
regulation was not content-based, but was a time, place, or manner 
restriction.58 Time, place, or manner restrictions are subject to intermediate 
scrutiny and thus they must be "narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest" and must "leave open ample alternative channels for 
communication of the information."59 The Court of Appeals held that while 
the Park Service could reduce the size, duration, and frequency of the 
demonstrations, an absolute ban failed intermediate scrutiny. The Supreme 
Court, however, argued that *956 the Court of Appeals' "suggestions 
represent no more than a disagreement with the Park Service over how much 
protection the core parks require or how an acceptable level of preservation 
is to be attained."60 The Court declared that the judiciary lacked "the 
authority to replace the Park Service as the manager of the Nation's parks or 
... the competence to judge how much protection of park lands is wise and 
how that level of conservation is to be attained."61 The Court refused to 
question factual judgments made by Park Service officials that were 
essential for the proper application of intermediate scrutiny. 
 In Goldman v. Weinberger,62 an Orthodox Jew and ordained rabbi who 
served as a clinical psychologist at an Air Force base challenged a military 
regulation which prohibited him from wearing his yarmulke. He claimed it 
violated his First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion. The 
Court declared that it would "give great deference to the professional 
judgment of military authorities concerning the relative importance of a 
particular military interest."63 In applying this "great deference," the Court 
observed that in the Air Force's "professional judgment," standardized 
uniforms are "vital during peacetime as during war" because of the need for 
discipline, obedience, unity, and "subordination of personal preferences and 
identities."64 Goldman contended that the Air Force failed to prove that 
making an exception for wearing a yarmulke would threaten the Air Force's 
goals. He also argued that "the Air Force's assertion to the contrary is a mere 
ipse dixit, with no support from actual experience or a scientific study in the 
                         
56 468 U.S. 288 (1984). 
57 The National Park Service acted pursuant to 36 C.F.R. § 50.19(e)(8) (1983). 
58 Clark, 468 U.S. at 293. 
59 Id. at 293. 
60 Id. at 300. 
61 Id. at 298. 
62 475 U.S. 503 (1986). 
63 Id. at 507. 
64 Id. at 508. 
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record"65 and that the Air Force's contentions were refuted by "expert 
testimony that religious exceptions to [the regulation] are in fact desirable 
and will increase morale by making the Air Force a more humane place."66 
The Court determined, however, that the expert testimony was irrelevant, 
because "[t]he desirability of dress regulations in the military is decided by 
the appropriate military officials."67 The practice of deference in Goldman 
involved the acceptance, without much evidentiary support, of not only the 
military officials' judgment about the importance of the regulation's goals 
(discipline, obedience, *957 and subordination of personal identity), but also 
about its tailoring to these goals. The Court accepted without question the 
factual judgment of the Air Force officials that standardized uniforms could 
not achieve these goals with religious exceptions.68  
 In O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,69 Muslim inmates at a state prison 
challenged a work policy which prevented them from attending Jumu'ah, a 
congregational service held on Fridays mandated by the Qur'an. Prison 
administrators found it too burdensome to permit those prisoners working 
outside the prison to return to the facility during the hours of the Jumu'ah 
service. The Court concluded that the prison policy did not violate the Free 
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.70 The Court began by observing 
that prisoners "clearly retain protections afforded by the First 
Amendment,"71 limited only when they conflict with legitimate "penological 
                         
65 Id. at 509. 
66 Id. 
67 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 509. 
68 Recently, the D.C. Circuit used Clark to uphold a regulation by the National Park 
Service that banned the sale of message-bearing T-shirts on the National Mall. 
Although the T-shirts often contained political messages, espousing causes such as 
raising public awareness for POW/MIAs, urging action to combat global warming, 
and advocating statehood for the District of Columbia, the Park Service banned 
their sale to reduce commercialism on the Mall. The vendors of the T-shirts 
complained that the T-shirt was the primary source of funds that enabled them to 
continue to engage in First Amendment activities. The district court found that the 
ban was not narrowly tailored because the goal of reducing commercialism could be 
reached short of a complete ban by designating certain areas for the T-shirt sales. 
See Friends of the Vietnam Veterans Mem'l v. Kennedy, 899 F. Supp. 680, 686-87 
(D.D.C. 1995). The D.C. Circuit reversed, claiming that it would not consider "what 
the Park Service could have done" to limit its regulation so that it would be less 
restrictive, and stated that it did not have "'the authority to replace the Park Service 
as manager of the Nation's parks or ... the competence to judge how much 
protection of parklands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be attained." 
Friends of the Vietnam Veterans Mem'l v. Kennedy, 116 F.3d 495, 498 (D.C. Cir. 
1997) (quoting Clark, 468 U.S. at 299). 
69 482 U.S. 342 (1987). 
70 See id. at 353. 
71 Id. at 348. 
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objectives."72 Nevertheless, the Court noted that prison officials are entitled 
to deference and that the "evaluation of penological objectives is committed 
to the considered judgment of prison administrators."73 The Court declared 
that it would refuse to "'substitute our judgment on ... difficult and sensitive 
matters of institutional administration,' for the determinations of those 
charged with the formidable task of running a prison." 74  
 *958 A central aspect of the Court's examination involved the viability 
of several alternative ways that the prison could permit the inmates to attend 
Jumu'ah services.75 One suggestion was that all Muslim inmates work inside 
the prison on Fridays.76 Another alternative was that the Muslims would 
work on a day during the weekend instead of on Fridays.77 However, the 
Court rejected both of these suggestions, relying entirely on the bald 
assertions of the prison officials that these alternatives were not feasible.78 
The Court noted that the district court found that the additional supervision 
required to permit Muslim prisoners to work on weekends "'would be a 
drain on scarce human resources' at the prison."79 The district court opinion, 
however, contained no indication that the prison supplied any evidence to 
support this claim.80 Second, the Court observed that "[p]rison officials 
determined that the alternatives would also threaten prison security by 
allowing 'affinity groups' in the prison to flourish."81 The only supporting 
evidence was the testimony of the prison administrator, which the Court 
quoted in part: "[A]lmost every prison administrator knows that any time 
you put a group of individuals together with one particular affinity interest 
... you wind up with ... a leadership role and an organizational structure that 
will almost invariably challenge the institutional authority."82 As in 
Goldman and Clark, the Court failed to question the bare assertions of the 
officials under review. 
 As illustrated by these examples, the practice of deference involves the 
way the Court evaluates factual claims made by the government institutions, 
officials, and experts under review. Deference is practiced as the acceptance 
of these factual and empirical judgments without much questioning or 
                         
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 349. 
74 O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353 (quoting Block v. Rutherford, 468 U.S. 576, 588 (1984)) 
(citation omitted). 
75 Id. at 352-53. 
76 Id. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353 (quoting Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 932 
(D.N.J. 1984)). 
80 See Shabazz v. O'Lone, 595 F. Supp. 928, 932 (D.N.J. 1984). 
81 O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 353. 
82 Id. (quoting from transcript). 
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skepticism. In a judicial balancing approach, a court's task is to evaluate the 
evidence about the existence or nonexistence of certain factual conditions 
(the importance of the government's interest and the tailoring of means to 
ends). Evaluation involves an examination of the quantity and quality of the 
evidence supporting a particular decision. A less skeptical evaluative 
method directly affects whether the requirements of the *959 judicial 
scrutiny formulas will be satisfied. Thus, in an age where factual and 
empirical evidence is becoming more integral to the interpretation of the 
Constitution, the current practice of deference is having a profound effect on 
the outcomes of judicial decisions. 
 
B. THE BREADTH AND SCOPE OF DEFERENCE 
 
 Although the deference principle hovers over constitutional 
jurisprudence, it is explicitly invoked and practiced in a particular group of 
cases involving a common set of contexts: (1) experts or professionals with 
a particular expertise in making certain factual judgments; or (2) institutions 
such as administrative agencies, prisons, schools, and the military that 
envelop much of contemporary life.83 I refer to these contexts collectively as 
the "bureaucratic state." Typically, courts defer to decisionmakers (often 
located in an institutional setting) who, by virtue of their day-to-day 
activities or professional training, have specialized knowledge or expertise. 
 One of this century's most profound developments in the American 
social and political structure was the rise of the bureaucratic state. 
Throughout human history, large institutions (feudal, ecclesiastical, and 
monarchical) have often existed in societies. The defining characteristic of 
the modern institution is its highly developed bureaucratic structure with 
hierarchies of power and established standards and processes. These 
institutions have their own special politics, practices, cultures, and 
traditions. According to Max Weber, bureaucracy consists of fixed areas of 
specialty, a carefully controlled distribution of authority to act, a system of 
hierarchical levels of authority, and a set of general rules and procedures to 
govern the behavior of persons operating within the system.84 Today, 
American bureaucracy is characterized by highly specialized systems of 
controlled expertise. These systems are designed to process immense 
amounts of complex factual and empirical data. Thus, Weber observes that 
                         
83 See, e.g., Owen M. Fiss, The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary, 92 YALE L.J. 
1442, 1442 (1983) ("The history of the twentieth century is largely the history of 
increasing bureaucratization."); Gerald E. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in 
American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1295 (1984) ( "Bureacracy is the primary 
form of organized power in America today ...."). 
84 MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 196-98 (H.H. Gerth & 
C. Wright Mills eds., 1946). 
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the bureaucratic state depends heavily on expertise: 
 
The more complicated and specialized modern culture becomes, the more its 
external supporting apparatus demands *960 the personally detached and 
strictly 'objective' expert, in lieu of the master of older social structures, who 
was moved by personal sympathy and favor, by grace and gratitude.85  
 
 The complexity of modern regulation demands specialized knowledge 
and large sophisticated public institutions. Although our entire society is not 
structured in these massive conglomerates of associated expertise, a very 
large part of our lives comes under the influence of these entities. While 
humankind has always been subject to the power of various institutions, the 
bureaucratic state employs a distinct structure of power with distinct 
possibilities for and impediments to individual self-definition. 
 Today, we live in a world composed significantly by government 
institutions. There are about 1 million people incarcerated in our prisons.86 
In 1800, the federal government had 3000 civilian employees; now, it has 
3.1 million civilian employees in 143 federal agencies.87 Between the turn of 
the century and WWII, the number of federal employees grew at a rate four 
times greater than the population.88 From 1947 to 1980, the size of 
legislative staffs increased by 600%.89 There are numerous governmental 
and private enclaves of expertise, as well as a burgeoning mass of hybrids: 
privately-run institutions operating under government funding or performing 
government functions.90  
 Not only do a myriad of new institutions govern almost every aspect of 
society, but our traditional institutions have grown substantially. "In 
addition to some 500 senators and representatives," observes Owen Fiss, 
"Congress now consists of about 40,000 employees, more than 300 
committees and subcommittees, and 8 internal agencies."91  
 Currently, although fundamental rights are protected by strict scrutiny, 
when they arise in the contexts of the bureaucratic state, the deference 
principle remains the dominant force. Today, even when important freedoms 
and liberties are implicated, courts defer *961 in cases involving the 
commerce clause as well as cases involving social and economic 
                         
85 Id. at 216. 
86 See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 
217 (1995). 
87 See JERRY L. MASHAW ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 6 (3d ed. 1992). 
88 See Henry Steele Commager, The American Mind 339 (1950). 
89 See STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF 
PROFESSIONALS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE 130 (1994). 
90 See infra note 367. 
91 Fiss, supra note 83, at 1442. 
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regulation.92 Courts frequently accord deference to the judgments of 
numerous decisionmakers: Congress,93 state legislatures,94 agencies,95 
military officials,96 prisons,97 government health institutions,98 prosecutors,99 
defense attorneys,100 government employers,101 and practically any other 
decisionmaker in a position of authority or expertise.102  
 Courts readily defer to administrative agencies--to the fact-finding of 
administrative tribunals and the factual conclusions underlying agency 
regulations103 as well as to agency interpretations of federal law.104 Even 
when faced with infringements to rights typically protected by heightened 
scrutiny, courts often defer when reviewing the factual judgments made by 
                         
92 See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963). 
93 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665 (1994) ( "[C]ourts must 
accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of Congress."). 
94 E.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 176 (1976) (stating that courts owe 
deference to state legislatures). 
95 E.g., Chevron, U.S.A. Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984) (deferring to agency interpretations of law); United States v. Carlo Bianchi 
& Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963) (deferring to agency factfinding). 
96 E.g., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-08 (1986) (holding that courts 
"must give great deference to the professional judgment of military authorities"). 
97 E.g., O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349  (1987) (holding that courts 
must "afford appropriate deference to prison officials"). 
98 E.g., Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 & n.30  (1982) (holding that 
decisions made by a "professional"--"a person competent, whether by education, 
training or experience, to make the particular decision at issue"--are presumptively 
valid). 
99 E.g., Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (holding that courts must be 
very deferential to prosecutors when reviewing claims of selective prosecution). 
100 E.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984) ( "Judicial scrutiny of 
counsel's performance must be highly deferential."). 
101 E.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) ("[W]e have consistently 
given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to justify 
restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify 
restrictions on the speech of the public at large."). 
102 E.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Nonviolence, 468 U.S. 288, 299 (1984) 
(holding that the judiciary must defer to the Park Service's judgment of "how much 
protection of park lands is wise and how that level of conservation is to be 
attained"). 
103 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402  (1971). 
104 See Chevron, U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991), an agency interpreted a statute that 
prohibited the use of federal funds in programs where abortion was a method of 
family planning to apply not only to performing abortions but also to any 
counseling concerning abortions. The Court, noting that the statute was ambiguous 
as to this issue, deferred under Chevron to the agency's interpretation. See id. at 184 
(according "substantial deference" to agency's interpretation). 
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officials in institutions or by *962 persons with expertise. Courts frequently 
defer to the judgments of employers who fire employees for expressing their 
political views.105 Courts also defer to the judgments of officials at 
government mental health institutions. For example, in Youngberg v. 
Romeo,106 the Court held that individuals involuntarily committed to 
treatment facilities had "liberty interests in safety and freedom from bodily 
restraint."107 The Court determined that the proper level of necessity to 
"justify use of restraints or conditions of less than absolute safety" was 
"reasonable" rather than "compelling" or "substantial."108 However, the 
Court also articulated an additional standard of deference: "In determining 
what is 'reasonable' ... we emphasize that courts must show deference to the 
judgment exercised by a qualified professional."109 Thus, the Court held that 
because "judges or juries are [not] better qualified than appropriate 
professionals in making such decisions," the official's decision would be 
"presumptively valid."110  
 Courts readily defer to legislatures when a statute involves forecasts and 
predictions,111 and complex factual data based on technical and scientific 
expertise.112 For example, in Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC,113 
the Court upheld against a First Amendment *963 challenge "must-carry" 
                         
105 See, e.g., Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) ("[W]e have 
consistently given greater deference to government predictions of harm used to 
justify restriction of employee speech than to predictions of harm used to justify 
restrictions on the speech of the public at large."); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 
152 (1983) ("[A] wide degree of deference to the employer's judgment is 
appropriate."). For a good analysis of Waters v. Churchill, see Kermit Roosevelt, 
Note, The Cost of Agencies: Waters v. Churchill and the First Amendment in the 
Administrative State, 106 YALE L.J. 1233 (1997). 
106 457 U.S. 307 (1982). For a critique of the Court's deferential standard of review 
in Youngberg, see Susan Stefan, Leaving Civil Rights to the "Experts": From 
Deference to Abdication Under the Professional Judgment Standard, 102 YALE L.J. 
639 (1992). 
107 Youngberg, 457 U.S. at 319. 
108 Id. at 322. 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at 323. 
111 E.g., Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99  (1943) (deferring to the 
government's predictions as to the likelihood of espionage and sabotage by 
Japanese-Americans during World War II). 
112 E.g., Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 
102-03 (1973) (examining the legislative and administrative development of the 
broadcast system). 
113 512 U.S. 622 (1994). In this case the Court articulated the deferential standard 
and then remanded to a three-judge panel for consideration of the facts in light of 
that standard. The Court then affirmed the decision of the three-judge panel. See 
Turner Broad. Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180 (1997). 
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regulations that required cable operators to carry broadcast stations. The 
Court determined that the regulations were content-neutral restrictions on 
free speech requiring intermediate scrutiny but then then stated that the 
review of Congress' factual predictions should be accorded "substantial 
deference."114  
 The standard of review for many challenges to the criminal justice 
system, which implicate a panoply of constitutional rights, is highly 
deferential. When determining whether a punishment is proportional to the 
gravity of a particular criminal offense for the purposes of the Eighth 
Amendment, courts "grant substantial deference to the broad authority that 
legislatures necessarily possess in determining the types and limits of 
punishments for crimes."115 Likewise, ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims are reviewed with great deference. In Strickland v. Washington,116 the 
Court held that claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth 
Amendment should be reviewed under a reasonableness standard.117 
Additionally, the Court declared that "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's 
performance must be highly deferential.... [A] court must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance."118 Under this deferential standard, a court rejected 
an ineffective assistance claim involving an attorney in a capital trial who 
did not know the seminal case Gregg v. Georgia119 or any other criminal 
precedent other than Miranda.120 Another court rejected an ineffective 
assistance claim regarding an attorney who made a four-sentence closing 
argument in a capital murder case.121 The defendant was sentenced to death. 
In Mitchell v. Kemp,122 a court denied an ineffective assistance claim for a 
defense counsel in a capital case who called no witnesses and presented no 
mitigating evidence at the sentencing proceeding. In addition, the counsel 
made no attempt to interview potential witnesses and did not look into the 
defendant's medical or psychological *964 history. Earlier, during the 
regular trial, the attorney filed no pretrial motions. He failed to examine the 
police officer, a cousin of the victim and a witness to the defendant's 
                         
114 Turner, 512 U.S. at 665. For a critique of the Turner cases, see Note, Deference 
to Legislative Fact Determinations in First Amendment Cases After Turner 
Broadcasting, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2312 (1998). 
115 Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 (1983). 
116 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
117 See id. at 688. 
118 Id. at 689. 
119 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
120 See Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587 (11th Cir. 1984). 
121 See Romero v. Lynaugh, 884 F.2d 871, 875 (5th Cir. 1989)  (reversing a finding 
of ineffective assistance of counsel by the district court). 
122 762 F.2d 886 (11th Cir. 1985). 
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confession because, in counsel's words, "I personally don't like the man."123 
The defendant was sentenced to death, and after the Supreme Court denied 
certiorari, he was executed. 
 When reviewing prosecutorial decisions--such as selective prosecution 
and claims for potential discriminatory jury selection--courts again are 
highly deferential. In United States v. Armstrong,124 the Court held that due 
to "deference" for prosecutorial decisions, claimants charging selective 
prosecution must make a demanding showing even to obtain discovery.125 
When reviewing prosecutiorial decisions, "'[t]he presumption of regularity 
supports' their prosecutorial decisions and 'in the absence of clear evidence 
to the contrary, courts presume that [prosecutors] have properly discharged 
their official duties."126 For example, Wayte v. United States127 involved a 
prosecution for failure to register for the draft. Wayte claimed that only 
those that did so vocally--exercising their political speech--were singled out 
for prosecution. Deferring to the discretion of the prosecutor, the Court 
denied Wayte even the opportunity to obtain discovery. 
 When reviewing fundamental rights infringed by the military, courts are 
likewise exceedingly deferential.128 The Goldman Court upheld an 
infringement on an individual's free exercise of religion.129 The Court 
applied deference in Rostker v. Goldberg130 to uphold against an equal 
protection challenge a law requiring the conscription of males but not 
females. Under deferential review, courts have sustained the military's 
policies on homosexuals, even when free speech rights were implicated.131 
In addition, courts have *965 consistently upheld various restrictions on free 
speech in the military, including prior restraints.132  
                         
123 Mitchell v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 1026, 1026 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting from 
denial of certiorari). 
124 517 U.S. 456 (1996). See also Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) 
(prohibiting the discriminatory use of preemptory challenges); Wayte v. United 
States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (rejecting a selective prosecution claim). 
125 Armstrong, 517 U.S. at 463. 
126 Id. at 464 (quoting United States v. Chemical Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 
(1926)) (first alteration in original). 
127 470 U.S. 598 (1985). 
128 For a good analysis of First Amendment rights and the military, see Dienes, 
supra note 9. 
129 See supra Part II.A (discussing Goldman). 
130 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
131 See, e.g., Steffan v. Perry, 41 F.3d 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc); Ben-Shalom 
v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454 (7th Cir. 1989). See generally Harris, supra note 8; 
Henriksen, supra note 13 (discussing numerous cases involving deference to the 
military). 
132 See, e.g., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980) (upholding Air Force regulation 
requiring prior approval of all petitions circulated); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 
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 In the prisons, courts defer to judgments of prison officials that 
implicate freedom of expression and religion.133 In Pell v. Procunier,134 the 
Court upheld, without discussing any less restrictive alternatives, a 
regulation that prohibited fact-to-face interviews between inmates and the 
media. In Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union,135 the Court 
upheld a regulation restricting prisoners' ability to form labor unions, which, 
in turn, severely infringed on their free speech rights. In Bell v. Wolfish,136 
the Court upheld regulations banning hardbound books mailed to inmates 
from sources other than book clubs or publishers. Even with the passage of 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act,137 which elevated the level of 
scrutiny for prisoners' free exercise claims to strict scrutiny, courts 
continued to apply deference, rendering the Act virtually ineffectual in 
prisons.138  
 Recently, the D.C. Circuit upheld an amendment, attached to the 1997 
Budget Act, that effectively prohibited the distribution in prisons of any 
publication or material that "is sexually explicit or features nudity."139 The 
purported goal of the law was to further the "rehabilitation" of prisoners. 
The district court enjoined the law because it was not content- neutral; it 
focused exclusively on the "sexual nature of the publications"; and the 
legislative history indicated that its real aim was to "make prisons more 
punitive."140 The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that although Congress did 
not consider any social science data, "the government could rationally have 
seen *966 a connection between pornography and rehabilitative values."141 
Judge Wald dissented, noting that the majority simply deferred to Congress' 
claim that the Amendment was "reasonably related to the interests 
asserted."142 Due to its deference, the majority looked to whether there was 
"any conceivable basis" to support the law, a test under which "there would 
                                                          
(1976) (upholding regulations barring political speech at a military base by 
civilians); see also Stephanie A. Levin, The Deference That Is Due, Rethinking the 
Jurisprudence of Judicial Deference to the Military, 35 VILL. L. REV. 1009 (1990). 
133 For a more detailed examination of prisoners' First Amendment rights, see 
Solove, supra note 17. See also MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS (2d 
ed. 1993); Ira P. Robbins, The Prisoners' Mail Box and the Evolution of Federal 
Inmate Rights, 144 F.R.D. 127 (1993); Geoffrey S. Frankel, Note, Untangling First 
Amendment Values: The Prisoners' Dilemma, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1614 (1991). 
134 417 U.S. 817 (1974). 
135 433 U.S. 119 (1977). 
136 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
137 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 to -4 (1994). 
138 See Solove, supra note 17, at 460. 
139 Pub. L. No. 104-208, § 614, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996). 
140 Amatel v. Reno, 975 F. Supp. 365, 369 (D.D.C. 1997). 
141 Amatel v. Reno, 156 F.3d 192, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
142 Id. at 205-06. 
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be no need for judicial review at all, for no statute infringing on inmates' 
constitutional rights would fail to satisfy the test."143  
 In sum, given the staggering breadth of the bureaucratic state, the 
fundamental rights of millions of citizens are routinely curtailed by an 
intricate web of regulations designed by bureaucrats and by a countless 
series of decisions made by government officials. Deference extends 
pervasively throughout the bureaucratic state, resulting in an alarming 
frequency in which judicial review is practically ineffectual in protecting 
fundamental constitutional rights. 
 
C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF DEFERENCE FOR MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW 
 
 The practice of deference presents severe problems for maintaining 
judicial review as an institution that furthers the values of liberalism. Put 
most broadly, modern liberalism aims to empower individuals to realize 
their full potential as selves, to develop their creative and intellectual 
capacities, and to promote freedom in discourse and expression.144 One of 
the lasting legacies of the Warren Court is its demonstration that judicial 
review can serve as a powerful tool of liberalism--a significant change from 
the way New Deal liberals viewed judicial review, as a practice preserving 
conservative ideologies and thwarting democratic reforms. Of course, not all 
liberal theorists agree that the Warren Court liberalism was commendable. 
Despite these disputes, most modern liberals see judicial review as a 
potentially positive instrument of liberalism and as a necessary check on the 
discretion of government officials.145 Of course, it is certainly possible for 
other branches of government to protect rights and further liberal values. 
But my point is a narrow *967 one--namely, that despite their differences, 
liberal theorists of judicial review generally support a vigorous judicial 
scrutiny when fundamental constitutional rights are involved.146  
                         
143 Id. at 206. 
144 Liberalism is a broad term, encompassing a wide variety of philosophical 
viewpoints. For some classic statements of liberalism, see JOHN DEWEY, Liberalism 
and Social Action, in 11 THE LATER WORKS, 1925-1953, at 1 (Jo Ann Boydston 
ed., 1991); JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpherson 
ed., 1980) (1690); JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (David Spitz ed., 1975) (1859). 
145 For a detailed examination of the debates about liberalism among legal thinkers, 
see LAURA KALMAN, THE STRANGE CAREER OF LEGAL LIBERALISM (1996). 
146 In legal and political scholarship, proponents of liberalism have generally 
embraced judicial review, even in the face of the countermajoritarian difficulty. See, 
e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 40; BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE 
PEOPLE: TRANSFORMATIONS (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS]; 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE]; 
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 6; ELY, supra note 37; TRIBE, 
supra note 33. Even Alexander Bickel, who best described the problem of the 
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 There are at least three reasons why the practice of deference poses 
significant problems for liberal theories of judicial review. First, the 
bureaucratic state poses problems that all liberal theories of judicial review, 
regardless of their differences, cannot ignore. Increasingly, individual 
autonomy and freedom are becoming circumscribed by government 
institutions. The problem for liberalism is that the geography of liberty has 
radically changed since the founding days of the Constitution. Today, our 
liberty is bound up in the institutions that employ, license, regulate, 
conscript, imprison, police, and educate us. We live under a sprawl of 
numerous interacting and overlapping regulatory regimes, controlling the 
types of food we eat, the medicines we take, the roads we drive, the products 
we use, the air we breathe, and the layout of the cities in which we live. 
Decisions about what we watch on television, what we learn in school, what 
we can say at work, and how much privacy we will have are frequently 
made by public and private bureaucrats, officials to whom we have scant 
access to and over whom we have little power. Their decisions, however, 
play an enormous role in shaping liberty in the modern state. Deference 
places the burgeoning contexts of the bureaucratic state--the rise of 
administrative agencies, the growth in the power and pervasiveness of 
existing institutions--outside the scope of more searching judicial inquiry. 
This means that the geography of liberty is shifting toward areas that are 
protected only by deferential judicial review. 
 Second, due to the growing emphasis on factual and empirical evidence 
in constitutional interpretation, the effects of deference are proving to be 
quite significant. Because the practice of deference insulates governmental 
judgments about factual and empirical evidence *968 from judicial scrutiny, 
it has an increasingly greater effect on the outcome of judicial decisions. In 
light of the growing emphasis on facts in constitutional interpretation, 
deference threatens to eviscerate judicial review in the contexts of the 
bureaucratic state. The cases discussed earlier dealt with rights that are 
central to rights-based liberalism: the right to the free exercise of religion in 
O'Lone and Goldman; the right to free expression in Clark, the rights to 
liberty and equality in Korematsu. The practice of deference represents a 
disturbing degradation of the power of judicial review. This does not mean 
that liberal values go unprotected but that judicial review, which history has 
demonstrated can be a powerful tool for the furtherance of liberal values, is 
effectively shut out of the bureaucratic state. 
 The third reason why deference poses a difficulty for liberalism is that 
                                                          
countermajoritarian difficulty, did not advocate for the abolition of judicial review. 
In The Least Dangerous Branch, Bickel argued that judicial review should still 
remain highly principled; however, because the court was countermajoritarian yet 
dependent upon the respect of the people for its power, it had to be extremely 
cautious about the exercise of judicial review. See BICKEL, supra note 5. 
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the current developments in society, government, and the judicial system are 
all leaning toward a heightening of the practice of deference. The 1990 
Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee indicated that within the past 
thirty years, the caseload of the federal courts has increased at a much 
greater rate than the number of judges and that the federal court system was 
quite near the feasible limit of its growth.147 The legislative and executive 
branches, as well as the administrative agencies, have grown much more 
substantially than the judiciary.148 In The Federal Courts, Judge Posner 
paints a portrait of the federal judicial system strained, stretched, and 
compromised by a burgeoning caseload and its consequences.149 Indeed, the 
federal judiciary increasingly resorts to unpublished dispositions, 
streamlining of review, and assembly-line jurisprudence with the aid of law 
clerks.150 Judge Posner observes that judicial deference has escalated, in 
part, to help alleviate the caseload crisis: 
 
[The modern tendency] has been to enlarge the deference due the court or 
administrative agency whose decision is being reviewed. The result, whether 
intended or not, is to reduce the incentive to appeal by making it more difficult 
to obtain a reversal, and to reduce the amount of work that *969 the appellate 
court has to do in cases that are appealed, since it is easier to decide whether a 
finding is reasonable or defensible than to decide whether it is right .... 151  
 
 We live in an age of increasing specialization, and government 
institutions have become enclaves of expertise. As the quantity of 
information grows--as well as the complexity and detail regarding numerous 
realms of regulated activity--the premium on expert judgment (the ability to 
sift through all the information, to weed out the good data from the bad, and 
to understand the field) will increase. Professor Susan Stefan observes that 
courts are deferring with greater frequency to the professional judgment of 
"experts" to resolve cases involving rights.152 Stefan points out that courts 
increasingly extend their application of the professional judgment 
standard--a deferential standard of review for expert judgments--to a larger 
set of contexts: mental institutions, prisons, schools, police, and zoning 
challenges.153  
                         
147 REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 5-7 (1990). 
148 See Neil K. Komesar, Taking Institutions Seriously: Introduction to a Strategy 
for Constitutional Analysis, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 377 (1984). 
149 See POSNER, supra note 7, at 53-192. 
150 See Judge Patricia M. Wald, Some Thoughts on Judging as Gleaned from One 
Hundred Years of the Harvard Law Review and Other Great Books, 100 HARV. L. 
REV. 887, 904-05 (1987). 
151 POSNER, supra note 7, at 176. 
152 Stefan, supra note 106, at 643. 
153 Id. 
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 As the concerns that animate the decision to defer become more 
paramount, will deference continue to expand? Will important rights 
increasingly be left to the mercy of government officials and their 
predictions and risk assessments? 
 Unfortunately, liberal theories of judicial review have failed to 
adequately confront deference. Scholars have often debated the descriptive 
accuracy of the deference principle (i.e., whether or not law can be separated 
from politics and policy), yet have rarely examined how the deference 
principle is embodied in practice. Indeed, most jurists accept the deference 
principle. Even if it is not descriptively accurate, the principle that judges 
should avoid impinging their personal ideology into constitutional 
interpretation remains a normative ideal. Yet many of the same jurists view 
the practice of deference as an abdication of judicial review. Why is 
deference practiced in the way it is? Are there ways available to embody the 
deference principle in practice? Why does deference prevail in the 
bureaucratic state? A much deeper understanding of deference is clearly 
necessary to answer these questions and to engage in a meaningful critique 
of deference. 
 
*970 III. A GENEALOGY OF DEFERENCE 
 
 In order to understand the practice of deference, its genealogy must be 
traced. This Part explains how the deference principle became associated 
with the practice of accepting, without much questioning, the factual 
judgments of the decisionmakers under review. Sketching the genealogy of 
deference will uncover the concerns, conceptions, and assumptions that 
underpin deference so that they can be examined and evaluated. 
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A. A FRACAS OVER FACTS: FIGHTING FOR THE MEANING OF THE  
DEFERENCE PRINCIPLE 
 
 Beneath the polished Holmesian rhetoric about the deference principle 
lie deeper issues Lochner-era jurisprudence struggled over--namely, the way 
the deference principle was to be embodied in practice. According to the 
legend of Lochner, the deference principle became sanctified after the 
Lochner era. The legend, however, only presents the surface of what 
occurred during the Lochner era and beyond. New Deal liberalism did not 
merely enshrine the deference principle after Lochner, it declared how the 
deference principle should be carried out in practice: as a method of 
reviewing the factual and empirical evidence pertaining to the 
constitutionality of laws. To explain how the deference principle acquired 
this meaning, this section examines the growing recognition in 
constitutional jurisprudence of the interrelationship between facts and 
interpretation. 
 Facts are intricately tied to legal standards and rules. "If you scrutinize a 
legal rule," Judge Jerome Frank once observed, "you will see that it is a 
conditional statement referring to facts."154 Rules are not like boxes into 
which facts are placed; instead, facts define and shape rules. Yet legal 
scholars continue to dismiss facts as an uninteresting element of 
jurisprudence. While jurists today certainly recognize that facts influence 
the meaning of law, the relationship between facts and law and its 
implications for jurisprudence and constitutional theory have received scant 
attention. Only a few isolated articles have examined this issue in depth.155 
In his wide-*971 ranging critique of constitutional theory, Paul Kahn aptly 
illustrates that the history of constitutional theory has, in large part, 
remained captivated with the question of legitimacy.156 Constitutional theory 
                         
154 JUDGE JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 14 (1949). 
155 For discussions of the Court's explicit use of empirical evidence, see generally 
THOMAS B. MARVELL, APPELLATE COURTS AND LAWYERS: INFORMATION 
GATHERING IN THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM (1978); Kenneth Culp Davis, Facts in 
Lawmaking, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 931 (1980); David L. Faigman, "Normative 
Constitutional Fact-Finding": Exploring the Empirical Component of 
Constitutional Interpretation, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 541 (1991); Geoffrey C. Hazard, 
Jr., The Supreme Court as a Legislature, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1978); Kenneth L. 
Karst, Legislative Facts in Constitutional Litigation, 1960 SUP. CT. REV. 75 (1960); 
Charles M. Lamb, Judicial Policy-Making and Information Flow to the Supreme 
Court, 29 Vand. L. Rev. 45 (1976); Arthur Selwyn Miller & Jerome A. Barron, The 
Supreme Court, the Adversary System, and the Flow of Information to the Justices: 
A Preliminary Inquiry, 61 VA. L. REV. 1187 (1975); Ann Woolhandler, Rethinking 
the Judicial Reception of Legislative Facts, 41 VAND. L. REV. 111 (1988). 
156 See PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-GOVERNMENT IN  
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY (1992). 
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has generally concerned itself with finding ways to reconcile judicial review 
with democratic principles.157 In the realm of jurisprudence, the focus has 
been on rules and principles rather than their relationship with facts.158 For 
example, Ronald Dworkin states that his theory concerns only "theoretical 
disagreements in law" rather than on "whether the facts satisfy some agreed 
test in some particular case."159 Although largely ignored, the relationship 
between facts and interpretation presents several important questions for 
jurisprudence: To what extent do facts influence legal interpretation? To 
what extent has recognition of the role of facts influenced the style and 
approach that courts have employed in legal and constitutional 
interpretation? How has the dissolving boundary between facts and law 
affected other longstanding legal distinctions and conceptions? 
 In the early twentieth century, during the heyday of the Lochner era, the 
Court explicitly recognized and grappled with the relationship between facts 
and interpretation. Most scholars have ignored this critical dimension of the 
Lochner era. A closer examination of legal thought during the turbulent 
years of the Lochner era reveals significant insight into how the Court 
struggled with this issue. As this Article demonstrates, it was the Court's 
confrontations with this issue that most influenced the Court's attempt to 
embody the *972 deference principle in post-Lochner-era constitutional law. 
 
1. Formalism, Pragmatism, and the Relationship Between Law and Fact 
 
 During the nineteenth century, formalism dominated constitutional 
jurisprudence. Epitomized by Langdell, formalism tended toward 
generalization, abstraction, and systemization in the law.160 It stemmed from 
the epistemological tradition in philosophy originating during the 
Enlightenment which was concerned with searching for foundations for 
knowledge and with discerning what could be known with certainty.161 
                         
157 Theorists of constitutional law have focused much of their energy on the 
legitimacy of judicial review. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 40 
(stating that legitimate judicial review occurs when the Court locates principles 
from past "constitutional moments" when the people were most engaged in public 
discourse and lawmaking); BICKEL, supra note 5 (stating that judicial review cannot 
be legitimate because it is inherently countermajoritarian); ELY, supra note 37 
(stating that legitimate judicial review depends upon the Court preventing stoppages 
in the processes of representative democracy). 
158 I have explored this problem in more depth in an earlier article. See Daniel J. 
Solove, Postures of Judging: An Exploration of Judicial Decisionmaking, 9 
CARDOZO STUD. IN L. & LITERATURE 173 (1997). 
159 DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 146, at 11, 73. 
160 See HORWITZ, supra note 27, at 13, 15. 
161 See id. at 16. For a more detailed account of the epistemological tradition in 
philosophy, shaped in large part from Enlightenment thought, see RICHARD RORTY, 
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Following this tradition, formalism focused heavily on the issue of 
legitimacy, the quest for rational foundations to justify precepts and 
practices. Formalism looked for foundations that were fixed and immutable. 
These foundations were often in the form of a priori principles, abstract 
propositions that were true for all ages, that were general enough to apply 
broadly across a multitude of situations. Formalists employed a highly 
deductive approach to legal reasoning.162 They did not reason from the 
ground-up, making tentative generalizations from the facts of particular 
situations. For the formalist, principles were not created and developed 
during the practice of interpretation; they already existed prior to the 
practice and were only waiting to be discovered. Formalists understood 
constitutional interpretation as a neutral method of discerning the fixed and 
eternal meaning of the Constitution,163 a meaning completely divorced from 
the personal ideology of any individual judge. 
 The prevailing wisdom today is that Lochner-era jurisprudence was 
rigidly formalistic.164 With its inflexible formalism, the oft-told *973 legend 
                                                          
PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979). 
162 See Neil Duxbury, Patterns Of American Jurisprudence 9  (1995) (observing that 
formalists employed "a narrower, deductive approach to decision-making whereby 
legal relationships were treated as somehow subsumed under a small collection of 
fundamental legal principles"). 
163 See South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905) ( "The 
Constitution is a written instrument. As such its meaning does not alter."); THOMAS 
COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON 
THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 124 
(Carrington's 8th ed. 1927) ("The meaning of the Constitution is fixed when it is 
adopted and is not different at any subsequent time."). 
164 See, e.g., Morgan Cloud, The Fourth Amendment During the Lochner  Era: 
Privacy, Property, and Liberty in Constitutional Theory, 48 STAN. L. REV. 555, 558 
(1996) ("In this article, I use the label 'formalism' to describe the body of ideas 
about law that encompassed these attributes of Lochner era jurisprudence, ideas that 
were part of the fundamental legal consciousness of the time."); Laura Kalman, 
Eating Spaghetti With a Spoon, 49 STAN. L. REV. 1547, 1559 (1997) ("Judicial 
formalism, meanwhile, reflecting 'the entrenched faith in laissez faire,' emerged in 
cases such as Lochner v. New York and Coppage v. Kansas.''); R. Randall Kelso, 
Styles of Constitutional Interpretation and the Four Main Approaches to 
Constitutional Interpretation in American Legal History, 29 VAL. U. L. REV. 121, 
191 (1994) ("The formalist-era approach to economic rights is best seen in Lochner 
v. New York, and its progeny.") (citation omitted); Molly S. McUsic, Looking 
Inside Out: Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 
591, 633 (1998) ("The jurisprudence of the Lochner-era Court was formalistic and 
categorical. The New Deal Court rejected this analysis and developed balancing 
tests to determine when a regulation crossed the constitutional line."); Frederick 
Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509, 511 (1988) ("Few decisions are charged 
with formalism as often as Lochner v. New York.''); Steve Sheppard, The State 
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goes, the Court engaged in rampant judicial activism. But this simple picture 
of the Lochner era Court ignores the conflict and turbulence of the times. 
The Lochner era was a time of profound change. It spanned almost forty 
years, and encompassed the overlapping careers of twenty-six Justices, with 
vastly different political leanings, philosophies of law, and judicial 
temperaments.165 The Lochner Court was not a unified institution, producing 
a monolithic constitutional jurisprudence but a divided and contentious 
Court issuing a surprisingly high number of inconsistent opinions. 
Formalism did not dominate the Court's jurisprudence, but was in the midst 
of a powerful challenge by pragmatism. As Stephen Seigel aptly observes, 
the Lochner era was "a transitional era that blended *974 the tenets of early 
and modern American constitutionalism."166 To disregard the conflict and 
contradictions of the era ignores one of the most important aspects of this 
chapter in constitutional jurisprudence--the Court's dynamic struggle over 
how to evaluate factual evidence. 
 The first half of the twentieth century was a remarkably dynamic time in 
legal thought. During the Lochner era, the formalistic conception of legal 
and constitutional interpretation began to undergo a profound change. This 
was due, in substantial part, to the influence of pragmatism on legal 
thinking.167 Among other things, pragmatism attacked the assumptions of 
                                                          
Interest in the Good Citizen: Constitutional Balance Between the Citizen and the 
Perfectionist State, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 969, 972 n.12 (1994) ("No more notorious 
banner for this phenomenon [formalism] flies in constitutional education than does 
Lochner v. New York ...."); Tom Stacy, What's Wrong With Lopez, 44 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 243, 244 (1996) ("The doctrinal categories of 'noncommercial activities' and 
'areas of traditional state regulation' constructed by the majority resurrect the 
mindless formalism of the Lochner Court. These categories enforce a blindness to 
the obvious national economic consequences of education, family structure, and tort 
liability, and otherwise disregard federalism's underlying values."). For a list of 
numerous additional sources that condemn the Lochner era as formalistic, see 
Schauer, supra, at 511 n.2. 
165 The Justices include: John Harlan (1877-1910); Horace Gray (1881- 1902); 
Melville Fuller (1888-1910); Henry Brown (1890-1906); George Shiras 
(1892-1903); Edward White (1894-1921); Rufus Peckham (1895-1909); Joseph 
McKenna (1898-1925); Oliver Wendell Holmes (1902-1932); William Day (1903- 
1922); William Moody (1906-1910); Horace Lurton (1909-1914); Charles Evans 
Hughes (1910-1916, 1930-1941); Willis Van Devanter (1910-1937); Joseph Lamar 
(1910-1916); Mahlon Pitney (1912-1922); James McReynolds (1914-1941); Louis 
Brandeis (1916-1939); John Clarke (1916-1922); William Taft (1921-1930); 
George Sutherland (1922-1938); Pierce Butler (1922-1939); Edward Sanford 
(1923-1930); Harlan Stone (1925-1946); Owen Roberts (1930-1945); and Benjamin 
Cardozo (1932- 1938). 
166 Stephen A. Siegel, Lochner Era Jurisprudence and the American Constitutional 
Tradition, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1, 4 (1991). 
167 Pragmatism, a distinctively American movement in philosophy, developed in the 
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formalism, such as the ability to ground claims of knowledge in immutable a 
priori principles.168 Shifting the focus of philosophy away from pure thought 
and immutable foundations, pragmatism emphasized facts, making the 
empirical realities of everyday life central to philosophy. William James 
declared that the pragmatist "turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, 
from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles, 
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards 
concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action and towards 
power."169 John Dewey advanced the "experimental method" (which he also 
called the "empirical method"). In contrast to the deductive method of 
traditional philosophy, which derived true propositions from irrefutable first 
principles, the experimental method focused on experience as "the starting 
point for philosophic thought."170 The experimental method was patterned 
after scientific inquiry, which began with difficulties and problems in 
experience, sought to define the difficulties, made hypotheses, and then 
tested the hypotheses by examining their consequences through continual 
experimentation.171 "Knowledge is *975 an affair of making sure," Dewey 
observed, "not of grasping antecedently given sureties."172 Dewey 
envisioned the empirical method as a map, providing guidance for critical 
inquiry.173 "Experimental method is something other than the use of 
blow-pipes, retorts and reagents. It is the foe of every belief that permits 
habit and wont to dominate invention and discovery, and ready-made system 
to override verifiable fact. Constant revision is the work of experimental 
inquiry."174  
 The pragmatic insistence on the importance of facts eroded the 
formalistic conception of legal and constitutional interpretation.175 
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Gradually, jurists began to recognize that the task of discerning the meaning 
of legal and constitutional provisions often depended upon an evaluation of 
factual and empirical evidence. This was not the simple realization that 
understanding that the facts of a case were important; rather, it was a 
recognition that law was not merely applied to facts, but that the meaning of 
the law was shaped by the facts. 
 This change did not occur overnight. The distinction between law and 
fact had existed in Anglo-American law for ages. Although it was called 
into question as early as the late eighteenth century,176 only in the early 
twentieth century did the distinction become a serious problem in 
jurisprudence. Formalism conceived of interpretation as a universal method 
of reasoning. It was a process of deducing the correct results from abstract 
principles of constitutional law rather than a ground-up inductive and 
experimental practice that varied throughout history. Factual and empirical 
claims were considered the domain of policy, matters that should be 
determined by legislatures, officials, or juries. For the formalist, legal 
interpretation transcended mere facts. If constitutional meaning were 
influenced by current empirical knowledge, the Constitution would no 
longer have a fixed and unchanging meaning. Thus, for the formalist, there 
had to be a relatively clear boundary between facts and law; the judge 
discerned what the law was through legal reasoning and applied it to the 
facts, but the meaning of the law was not dependent *976 upon the facts.  
 During the Lochner era, however, this view underwent a profound 
change. A vanguard of legal thinkers such as Roscoe Pound and Justices 
Cardozo and Holmes infused pragmatic ideas into the law and emphasized a 
more hermeneutical relationship between law and fact. Pound developed a 
notion of sociological jurisprudence, a theory of law that turned away from 
abstractions toward the current social scientific understandings of the day.177 
Justice Cardozo tempered the rigid conceptions of formalism with a 
pragmatic philosophy: "The rules and principles of case law have never been 
treated as final truths, but as working hypotheses, continually retested in 
those great laboratories of the law, the courts of justice."178 But most 
ironically, Justice Holmes, who loathed facts, also vigorously stressed their 
importance. "I hate facts," wrote Holmes. "I always say the chief end of man 
is to form general principles--adding that no general proposition is worth a 
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damn."179 Although recognizing that it would be good to immerse himself in 
facts, Holmes confessed: "I shrink from the bore."180 Holmes observed that 
law was "essentially empirical"181 and that "the man of the future is the man 
of statistics and the master of economics."182 Because he recognized that 
facts shaped legal meaning, Holmes viewed the jury system as infringing 
upon the province of the judiciary. He recognized that when juries applied 
facts to the law, they, in effect, were engaging in legal interpretation as well 
as affecting the meaning of the law. "[W]hen standards of conduct are left to 
the jury," Holmes observed, "it is a temporary surrender of a judicial 
function which may be resumed at any moment in any case when the court 
feels competent to do so.... [Otherwise this] would leave all our rights and 
duties throughout a great part of the law to the necessarily more or less 
accidental feelings of the jury."183 Specifically, Homes could not understand 
what made the "reasonable man" standard of negligence a *977 factual, as 
opposed to a legal, issue. With his usual cynical wit, Holmes observed: "[I]f 
a question of law is pretty clear we [judges] can decide it, as it is our duty to 
do, if it is difficult it can be decided better by twelve men taken at random 
from the street."184  
 The legal realists, who began to enter the scene during the Lochner era, 
also stridently emphasized the importance of facts in legal interpretation.185 
The realists recommended that the judiciary openly base their decisions on 
current social scientific, economic, and psychological understandings.186 
Felix Cohen argued that legal reasoning should not become divorced "from 
questions of social fact and ethical value."187 Rather than focus on 
                         
179 Letter from Holmes to Pollock (May 26, 1919), in 2 MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, 
HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS, 1874-1932, at 13-14 (1941). 
180 Id. 
181 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Codes and the Arrangement of the Law, 5 AM. L. REV. 
1, 4 (1870). 
182 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path Of The Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 187 (1920). 
183 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 100-01 (1881). 
184 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 HARV. L. REV. 
443, 457 (1899). 
185 See, e.g., FRANK, supra note 43; KALMAN, supra note 44, at 3  (stating that 
realism was "an attempt to understand law in terms of its factual context and 
economic and social consequences"); Brian Leiter, Rethinking Legal Realism: 
Toward a Naturalized Jurisprudence, 76 TEX. L. REV. 267, 275 (1997) (stating that 
realists argued that judges respond to the stimulus of facts). 
186 As Professor Singer observes about the realists: "The legal realists wanted to 
replace formalism with a pragmatic attitude toward law generally. This attitude 
treats law as made, not found. Law therefore is, and must be, based on human 
experience, policy, and ethics, rather than formal logic." Joseph William Singer, 
Legal Realism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 474 (1988) (book review). 
187 Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 
THE DARKEST DOMAIN                                                                               
transcendental concepts, he claimed, practitioners and scholars should focus 
on what the law does empirically. Jerome Frank, drawing upon his 
experience as a trial judge, became a vigorous proponent of the importance 
of facts. Similarly, Karl Llewellyn emphasized that meaning was not an 
inherent property in general rules; rather, the "heaping up of concrete 
instances" supplied rules with their meaning.188  
 The rigid conceptual boundary between facts and law quickly dissolved 
during the Lochner era. This change stemmed from the fact that the very 
style of constitutional adjudication was becoming more instrumental, often 
focusing on an empirical analysis of the connection between means and 
ends. Of course, vestiges of formalism remained in the constitutional 
jurisprudence of the Lochner era, but this was an era where categorical 
reasoning was breaking down. 
 In stark contrast to the prevailing wisdom that the Lochner-era Court 
was rigidly formalistic, the Court during this time was far from absolutist in 
its protection of contract and property rights. The Lochner-era Court openly 
acknowledged that contract and property *978 rights were not absolute and 
were subject to curtailment by the legitimate exercise of the state or federal 
government's "police power"--the power to regulate for the public welfare, 
to facilitate commerce, to protect against dangers, and to advance the health, 
prosperity, and safety of the people. For example, in Adkins v. Children's 
Hospital,189 the Court recognized that there was "no such thing as absolute 
freedom of contract."190 Likewise, in Coppage v. State of Kansas,191 the 
Court stated that it was "the thoroughly established doctrine of this court 
that liberty of contract may be circumscribed in the interest of the state and 
the welfare of its people."192  
 One of the crucial issues was the scope of the state or federal 
government's police power. The test for the scope of police power was 
whether or not the law was a "reasonable" exercise of the power. To be 
reasonable, the law had to address an existing danger or problem; and it had 
to have some logical connection to alleviating that danger. The changing 
style of lawmaking in the early twentieth century increasingly made this 
analysis fact-intensive. Inspired by the Progressive Movement of the late 
nineteenth century, the twentieth century opened amid a flurry of new laws 
and regulations. The progressives, reacting to great industrial and 
technological changes and the rise of big business during the latter half of 
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the nineteenth century, pushed for a new brand of regulation of 
industry--concerned with product safety, the powerlessness of the workers, 
and the power of trusts. These new laws were often very fact-specific; they 
controlled size, shape, number, and degree--from the size of strawberry 
containers to the weight of a loaf of bread. These laws were not broad 
generalities or statements of principle, but were intricate regulations of the 
minutia of industrial life. The new nature of these laws made the issue of 
whether they were reasonable exercises of police power one that was often 
unavoidably dependent on questions of fact. 
 The Lochner-era cases suggest that the Court understood the role of 
facts in determining the scope of the police power, and ultimately, the 
constitutionality of the law. The Court was quite self-conscious about the 
role of facts, and countless justices discussed the issue in majority opinions 
and dissents, such as the majority opinion of Justice Roberts in Nebbia v. 
People of State of New *979 York,193 that noted that "the reasonableness of 
each regulation depends upon the relevant facts."194 Justices were deeply 
divided in their approaches toward the relationship between facts and law. 
In Home Building & Loan Association v. Blaisdell,195 the Court upheld a law 
that imposed a moratorium on mortgage foreclosures. Justice Hughes, 
writing for the Court, stated that the scope of a constitutional prohibition 
was determined by its application: 
 
To ascertain the scope of the constitutional prohibition, we examine the course 
of the judicial decisions in its application. These put it beyond question that the 
prohibition is not an absolute and is not to be read with literal exactness like a 
mathematical formula.196  
 
 Hughes also argued that the Constitution had a meaning and application 
that evolved over time. He asserted that "[i]t is no answer to say that this 
public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist that what the 
provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that day it must mean to 
the vision of our time."197 Justice Sutherland wrote a fiery dissent, claiming 
that the Constitution "does not mean one thing at one time and an entirely 
different thing at another time."198 With rigid adherence to formalistic 
principles, Sutherland maintained a strict distinction between law and facts. 
He believed that the meaning of the provisions in the Constitution were 
unchanging, and that "it is only their application which is extensible."199 
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While Hughes articulated a hermeneutical relationship between law and fact, 
Sutherland's dissent viewed law as a rigid skeleton, having a unilateral 
relationship with facts. Thus, the simple dismissal of Lochner- era 
jurisprudence as formalistic conceals the tensions of the age. Lochner- era 
jurisprudence was engaged in a struggle over how to conceptualize the 
complicated relationship between law and facts. With this background in 
mind, I turn to Lochner itself. 
 
2. Evaluating the Empirical Facts in Lochner 
 
 In the opening paragraphs of Lochner, Justice Peckham, writing *980 
for the Court, stated that the right to make a contract "is part of the liberty of 
the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment."200 Peckham went 
on to recognize that contract rights may be curtailed through a state's 
"legitimate exercise of its police power."201 The Court then articulated the 
standard of review: whether the exercise of the state's police power was 
"reasonable and appropriate" or "unreasonable, unnecessary and 
arbitrary."202 This standard was beyond dispute and was applied in virtually 
all Lochner-era opinions.203 None of the dissents argued that a different 
standard should be employed. Instead, the dissenters charged the Lochner 
majority with second-guessing the legislature by imposing its own policy 
choices. However, the Lochner majority maintained that it was not 
"substituting the judgment of the court for that of the legislature."204 At least 
in its rhetoric, the Court did not hold that the law was invalid because it was 
unwise, but because it was irrational and, therefore outside the bounds of the 
state's police power.205 Thus, the Lochner majority was not disputing the 
deference principle; indeed, it agreed with the principle that the Court must 
avoid substituting its judgment for that of the legislature. 
 Instead, the real dispute concerned the method of review. The 
constitutionality of the statute depended upon the underlying empirical 
question of the extent of a material danger to the health of the workers. The 
Lochner Court concluded that in the case of the bakers there was no "fair 
ground, reasonable in and of itself, to say that there is a material danger to 
the public health or to the health of the employees, if the hours of labor are 
not curtailed."206 In reaching this conclusion, the Court was cavalier in its 
                         
200 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905). 
201 Id. 
202 Id. at 56. 
203 There are, of course, a few exceptions. In the most notable example, Coppage v. 
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1, 19 (1915), the Court seemed to imply that police powers only 
existed during emergencies. 
204 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56-57. 
205 Id. at 61. 
206 Id. 
                                                    84 IOWA LAW REVIEW             [1999]                                         
treatment of the facts and was overly dismissive of the legislature's claims 
about the danger to worker health. The Lochner opinion dismissed the 
existence of any danger to the workers' health without much mention of the 
evidence that led the New York legislature to conclude that such dangers 
required the protection of a law. The Lochner Court, however, did not 
completely ignore facts. Lochner's brief supplied statistics concerning the 
comparative healthiness of various occupations, *981 with the trade of a 
baker located in the middle of the pack. New York's brief contained no data 
in support of the statue.207 "In looking through statistics regarding all trades 
and occupations," Justice Peckham wrote, "it may be true that the trade of a 
baker does not appear to be as healthy as some other trades, but is also more 
healthy than still others."208 Rather than presume that the legislature had a 
factual basis to conclude that there was a danger to the health of bakers and 
place the burden on Lochner to refute these facts, the Court appeared to 
demand some type of proof from New York that such a danger existed: 
"There must be more than the mere fact of the possible existence of some 
small amount of unhealthiness to warrant legislative interference with 
liberty."209 Yet instead of engaging in a detailed factual analysis, the Court 
relied upon "the common understanding" that "the trade of a baker has never 
been regarded as an unhealthy one."210  
 Unlike Justice Holmes, who claimed that the Court had strayed from the 
deference principle, Justice Harlan, in dissent, focused on the Court's casual 
treatment of the empirical issue. He argued that the Court should not have 
been so dismissive of the legislature's factual finding that the hour limit was 
necessary to prevent danger to the health of the bakers.211 Harlan then cited 
treatises and commentary on the hazards of baking as well as the 
conclusions of a report by the New York Bureau of Statistics of Labor, 
which stated that shorter hours of work lead to improved health and longer 
life.212 The burden of proof was on the challenger of the law to refute the 
state's factual basis and the legislature did not have to provide elaborate 
evidence to justify its laws. In this case, there were enough facts to justify 
the law. Harlan recognized that although different conclusions could be 
drawn from the facts in Lochner, the fact that there was room for dispute 
was not a ground for striking down the law. 
 Harlan's dissent, in contrast to that of Holmes, is responsive to the 
dispute of the Lochner era over the way the Court evaluated factual 
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evidence. Yet Holmes' dissent, rather than Harlan's, became the 
widely-accepted explanation of the Court's failure in Lochner--perhaps a 
significant reason why the issue of facts has been ne-*982 erhaps a 
significant reason why the issue of facts has been neglected in subsequent 
accounts of Lochner -era jurisprudence. 
 
3. Justice Brandeis' World of Facts 
 
 Contrary to the popular wisdom, it was Justice Brandeis, rather than 
Justice Holmes, who battled in the trenches during the Lochner era, and who 
hammered out an approach over how the deference principle was to be 
embodied. As explained in the previous section, this issue was deeply 
connected to the relationship between law and fact, which was a major, 
unresolved question that loomed over Lochner-era jurisprudence. As 
Wigmore observed in 1924: 
  
Where a legislative act is argued to be unconstitutional, and this is to depend 
upon the unreasonableness, or the lack of possible reasonableness, of the law in 
its purpose or operation, and thus the external facts furnishing the possible 
legislative motive or the possible actual effect must be considered, this 
incidental question is not for the jury but for the court.... But by what theory or 
method shall the Court receive information of the alleged facts? This is an 
interesting inquiry, hitherto not carefully worked out by the courts.213  
 
 More than anyone else, Louis Brandeis, as both an attorney and then a 
Supreme Court Justice, brought attention to this issue. As Brandeis 
observed: "The determination of these questions involves an enquiry into 
facts. Unless we know the facts on which the legislators may have acted, we 
cannot properly decide whether they were (or whether their measures are) 
unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious."214 As a Justice, Brandeis immersed 
himself in facts, and his clerks spent much time in the Library of Congress 
gathering sociological data that would be stuffed into his opinions.215 
Brandeis' focus on the facts led John Dewey to declare that Brandeis' "strict 
adherence to this policy of reference to factual context is one of the great 
contributions to legal thought in the last generation."216  
 Even before he came to the Court in 1916, Brandeis had recognized 
*983 the importance of facts. In Muller v. Oregon,217 just three years after 
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Lochner, Brandeis (then an attorney) argued in defense of a statute that 
restricted the employment of females to no more than ten hours a day, a 
similar hour restriction to the one in Lochner. Brandeis submitted the 
famous "Brandeis brief," a 113-page brief which was unique because it 
provided factual and empirical support for the law in question.218 In direct 
response to Lochner's resort to "common understanding," Brandeis claimed 
that the facts in his brief were common knowledge, and the Court could take 
judicial notice of them.219 Brandeis' tactic was successful. Justice Brewer, 
writing for the Court, explicitly mentioned Brandeis' brief and recognized its 
importance by noting that "when a question of fact is debated and debatable, 
and the extent to which a special constitutional limitation goes is affected by 
the truth in respect to that fact, a widespread and long-continued belief 
concerning it is worthy of consideration.220  
 Brandeis' tactic created a stir. He would employ it again on numerous 
other occasions, including a 1,000 page brief in Bunting v. Oregon221 to 
defend an hour-restriction law for workers in mills, factories, or 
manufacturing establishments.222 Felix Frankfurter (also an attorney at the 
time) argued the case, distinguishing it from Lochner by claiming that 
principles vary according to the facts to which they are applied, and that in 
Bunting there was a "mass of data" not in existence when the Court decided 
Lochner.223 Again, the Brandeis brief tactic succeeded, and the Court upheld 
the law.224  
 Ultimately, however, Brandies believed that the "Brandeis brief" was a 
tactic that should not have been necessary. Brandeis believed that the 
challenger of a law, not the government, should bear the *984 burden of 
proving the validity of the factual basis for a law. When he came to the 
Court in 1916, Brandeis repeatedly stressed that the Court must be more 
accepting of the legislature's facts. In his opinion for the Court in Pacific 
States Box & Basket Co. v. White,225 he wrote: 
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When such legislative action 'is called in question, if any state of facts 
reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it, there is a presumption of the 
existence of that state of facts, and one who assails the classification must carry 
the burden of showing by a resort to common knowledge, or other matters 
which may be judicially noticed, or to other legitimate proof, that the action is 
arbitrary.'226  
 
 Although Brandeis stressed this point tirelessly,227 the Court failed to 
develop a sophisticated and uniform method of evaluating facts, and its 
failure captured the attention of a few commentators. In a 1924 article, 
Henry Wolfe Bikle observed that many disputes over the Court's 
interpretation of the Constitution boiled down to disputes over facts.228 In 
1936, another commentator argued that "issues of fact in constitutional 
decisions may at times have been realized, but adequate means for bringing 
the facts before the courts have been slow to develop."229 Additionally, a 
1930 note in the Columbia Law Review discussed the inconsistencies in the 
Court's treatment of facts: "Mr. Brandeis' presentation of [factual] material 
was marked with success in all the cases in which he prepared briefs. But 
Mr. Justice Brandeis has had to embody the results of many of his later 
investigations in dissenting opinions."230  
 These commentators suggested that the Justices disagreed significantly 
over how facts should be evaluated in cases of constitutional interpretation. 
Sometimes the Brandeis view would carry the day, and the Court would 
presume the facts for the government and *985 place the burden of proof on 
the challenger. In Borden's Farm Products Co. v. Baldwin,231 Justice 
Hughes, writing for the Court, declared that the presumption of 
constitutionality was a rebuttable presumption "of the existence of factual 
conditions supporting the legislation."232 The legislation was valid "if any 
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state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it."233 Under 
this view, the presumption meant that even hypothetical facts could support 
the legislature. Brandeis' view prevailed again in O'Gorman & Young, Inc. 
v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,234 in which the majority declared: "As 
underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of 
legislation of this character, the presumption of constitutionality must 
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation for overthrowing the 
statute." Justices Sutherland, Butler, McReynolds and Van Devanter, 
dubbed the "Four Horsemen" because they were the staunchest opponents of 
New Deal legislation, dissented claiming the government must demonstrate 
the circumstances necessary for a curtailment of rights.235  
 The Brandeis approach, however, did not always succeed. In Adkins v. 
Children's Hospital, 236 the Court explicitly departed from Muller and its 
progeny when it struck down a wage law for women. Writing for the Court, 
Justice Sutherland stated that "[a] mass of reports, opinions of special 
observers and students of the subject, and the like, has been brought before 
us in support of [the statute], all of which we have found interesting but only 
mildly persuasive."237 The Court made no mention of the presumption of 
constitutionality in favor of legislative facts. In Morehead v. People of the 
State of New York ex rel. Tipaldo,238 the Court again ignored the Brandeis 
brief, leading Justice Hughes to point to the statistics and assert that "we are 
not at liberty to disregard these facts." 239 Thus, while some cases, such as 
Nebbia, demonstrated a detailed examination of factual issues others relied 
more on the justices' common understandings. As one commentator 
observed: 
     
Theoretically, the presumption of constitutionality should *986 induce courts to 
uphold legislation if any set of facts could reasonably be conceived to sustain 
it, and, therefore, the necessity for legislative findings might be questioned. 
Experience has taught, however, that the absence of some concrete evidence of 
constitutional facts may adversely affect the presumption's force.240  
 
 The Court's lack of consensus about the proper method of evaluating 
facts became abundantly clear in a series of cases beginning in the 1930s 
regarding the "constitutional fact doctrine." Under this doctrine, when the 
Court determined that factual issues were essential to its duty of interpreting 
                         
233 Id. 
234 282 U.S. 251 (1931). 
235 Id. at 269. 
236 261 U.S. 525 (1923). 
237 Id. at 560. 
238 298 U.S. 587 (1936). 
239 Id. at 627 (Hughes, C.J., dissenting). 
240 Note, supra note 229, at 633. 
THE DARKEST DOMAIN                                                                               
the Constitution, it would review the facts de novo.241 The doctrine emerged 
from the "jurisdictional fact doctrine" which was first enunciated in Crowell 
v. Benson.242 In Crowell, an employer sought to enjoin the enforcement of a 
compensation award under the Longshoremen's Harbor Workers' 
Compensation Act. The award rested on the factual finding of an agency 
official that the employee was injured while employed by the defendant and 
while working in the navigable waters of the United States.243 Although the 
Act implied that the Deputy's findings of fact were final, the Court classified 
the facts as "jurisdictional facts," for "their existence [was] a condition 
precedent to the operation of the *987 statutory scheme."244 The Court held 
that it had the power to review the facts because they were essential to the 
enforcement of federal rights: 
     
The recognition of the utility and convenience of administrative agencies for 
the investigation and finding of facts within their proper province ... does not 
require the conclusion that there is no limitation of their use.... That would be 
to sap the judicial power as it exists under the federal Constitution, and to 
establish a government of bureaucratic character alien to our system, wherever 
fundamental rights depend, as not infrequently they do depend, upon the facts, 
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Lesbian, and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557 (1995) and New York Times 
v. Sullivan, 316 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 
229, 235 (1963) (overturning state trial court's factual conclusions regarding threat 
of violence and police protection in African-American student protest because "it 
remains our duty ... to make an independent examination of the whole record"); 
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 316 (1951) (reversing conviction of disorderly 
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(1951) (reversing conviction of Jehovah's Witnesses for disorderly conduct for 
giving Bible talks in public park). For further information about the constitutional 
fact doctrine, see, for example, Henry Wolf Bikle, Judicial Determination of 
Questions of Fact Affecting the Constitutional Validity of Legislative Action, 38 
HARV. L. REV. 6 (1924); George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 
87 NW. U. L. REV. 14 (1992); John Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson: Judicial Review 
of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional Fact," 80 U. PA. 
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Monaghan, Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229 (1985); Note, The 
Consideration of Facts in "Due Process" Cases, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 360 (1930); 
Note, The Presentation of Facts Underlying the Constitutionality of Statutes, 49 
HARV. L. REV. 631 (1936). 
242 285 U.S. 22 (1932). 
243 Id. at 36-37. 
244 Id. at 54. 
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and finality as to facts becomes in effect finality in law.245  
 
 The Crowell court also suggested that de novo review was appropriate 
for facts essential not only to federal statutory rights, but also to federal 
constitutional rights. Thus, the constitutional fact doctrine followed quite 
logically from the jurisdictional fact doctrine.246 As the Crowell Court 
expounded: "In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial 
power of the United States necessarily extends to the independent 
determination of all questions both of fact and law, necessary to the 
performance of that supreme function."247 Angered by these new 
doctrines--especially the constitutional fact doctrine--for their explicit 
refusal to presume the validity of the facts, Brandeis issued a lengthy and 
highly critical dissent. Shortly after Crowell, in Norris v. Alabama,248 the 
Court evaluated a state trial judge's denial of a motion to quash an 
indictment because of systematic exclusion of African-American jurors in 
the county of the trial. The Court reviewed the facts at the hearing de novo, 
declaring: "[W]henever a conclusion of law of a state court as to a federal 
right and findings of fact are so intermingled that the latter control the 
former, it is incumbent upon us to analyze the facts in order that the 
appropriate enforcement of the federal right may be assured."249 The Court 
reasoned that it must not merely examine whether a right was violated "in 
express terms" but "whether it was denied in substance and effect."250 
Otherwise, *988 the Court would not achieve its "purpose in safeguarding 
constitutional rights."251  
 In Saint Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States,252 the issue came to a 
head. More than any other case of the Lochner era, this one revealed where 
the justices stood on the relationship between facts and law. Chief Justice 
Hughes, who in Borden's Farm had followed the Brandeis approach, 
explained that the legislature could not be permitted to escape judicial 
review by dressing its regulations in elaborate factual findings.253 Hughes 
declared that "independent judicial review upon the facts and the law" was 
necessary because constitutional rights should not be placed "at the mercy of 
administrative officials."254  
 Although concurring in the result, Brandeis staunchly disagreed: "I 
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think no good reason exists for making special exception of issues of fact 
bearing upon a constitutional right."255 For Brandeis, the role of the Court 
was merely to determine whether the procedures by which the facts were 
found were proper, not to review the substance of the facts.256 Only in 
certain cases, such as habeas cases, could a court make a de novo 
determination of the facts.257 If there were conflicting facts in the record, "a 
court [should] not substitute its judgment for that of the legislative body."258 
Brandeis explained: 
 
The supremacy of law demands that there shall be opportunity to have some 
court decide whether an erroneous rule of law was applied and whether the 
proceeding in which facts were adjudicated was conducted regularly. To that 
extent, the person asserting a right, whatever its source, should be entitled to 
the independent judgment of a court on the ultimate question of 
constitutionality. But supremacy of law does not demand that the correctness of 
every finding of fact to which the rule of law is to be applied shall be subject to 
review by a court. If it did, the power of courts to set aside findings of fact by 
an administrative tribunal would be broader than their power to set aside a 
*989 jury's verdict. The Constitution contains no such command.259  
 
 In sum, the Court could not come to any unified or consistent method 
for evaluating facts or conceiving the relationship between law and facts, 
and this resulted in the inconsistent jurisprudence of the Lochner Court. 
Contrary to myth of the Lochner Court being unwavering in its rejection of 
New Deal and Progressive legislation, the Court upheld more laws than it 
struck down during the Lochner era,260 and in dissents as well as in majority 
opinions, Justices would frequently rattle off a laundry list of sustained 
regulations.261 Even the Four Horsemen sustained a significant number of 
regulations.262  
 The failure of the Court to come to any consistent method for 
approaching the law-fact relationship left several important questions 
unanswered: What was the extent of the presumption of constitutionality? 
Which side had the burden of proof? How could this burden be met? Should 
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260 See PAUL BREST & SANFORD LEVINSON, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL 
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261 See, e.g., Morehead v. New York, 298 U.S. 587, 628  (1936) (Hughes, C.J., 
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526-28 nn.24-29 (1934). 
262 See the extensive citations in the footnotes to Barry Cushman,  The Secret Lives 
of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559, 605-16 nn.56-58 (1997). 
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the Court presume hypothetical facts to support the legislation? 
 
4. Defining Deference: Carolene Products and the Evaluation of Facts 
 
 After the Lochner era ended in 1937, the Court did not "bring back" or  
"create" the presumption of constitutionality, for as discussed earlier, there 
was no dispute that laws were presumed to be constitutional, and countless 
Lochner-era opinions explicitly mentioned this fact.263 No new legal tests or 
doctrines were announced. *990 The Court used the same standards that it 
used during the Lochner era but embarked on a more consistent method of 
evaluating the factual data supporting the necessity of the legislation. After 
the Court's famous "switch in time," all New Deal reforms were upheld.264 
Brandeis' approach had prevailed. 
 In 1938, the Court decided United States v. Carolene Products Co.,265 
which became the most important opinion concerning judicial review since 
Marbury v. Madison.266 In examining whether a law prohibiting the 
shipment of filled milk was within Congress' power to regulate interstate 
commerce, the Court engaged in a lengthy elaboration of the deference 
principle. While for most scholars, the only aspect of Carolene Products 
                         
263 See, e.g., Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. State of Illinois, 292 U.S. 535, 547 (1934) 
("By reason of the presumption of validity which attends legislative and official 
action one who alleges unreasonable discrimination must carry the burden of 
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Carolene Products Revisited, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1087, 1087 (1982). It has also 
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and other agencies of government." Owen M. Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 
Term--Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 6 (1979). Initially, 
Footnote Four was virtually ignored by constitutional theorists. For example, in the 
first five years following the opinion, there was little mention of Footnote Four or 
Carolene Products in the pages of Harvard Law Review or the Yale Law Journal. 
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worthy of discussion is its famous Footnote Four, the opinion as a whole is a 
profound document about the relationship between facts and constitutional 
interpretation as well as about the meaning of the deference principle. 
Justice Stone understood that the mere incantation of the deference principle 
was not sufficient to guide the Court in its judicial review. In addition to 
asserting the importance of the deference principle, he also expounded in 
significant detail the way it was to be embodied in practice. Therefore, to 
understand deference, we must first look beyond the text of Footnote Four 
and revisit the complete opinion. A look at the text immediately preceding 
Footnote Four provides significant insight: 
 
[T]he existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment is to be presumed, 
for regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to 
be pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or 
generally assumed it is of such a character as to preclude *991 the assumption 
that it rests upon some rational basis within the knowledge and experience of 
the legislators.267  
 
 First, this quote suggests that the "presumption of constitutionality" 
concerns the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment. Second, 
it indicates that for laws affecting ordinary economic affairs, the challenger 
of the law must prove deficiencies in the empirical basis of the law; the 
government is not required to offer affirmative proof. Laws are 
unconstitutional only if facts "generally assumed" by, or "made known" to, 
the Court demonstrate that the factual conclusions supporting the law are 
unreasonable. Later in the opinion, the Court went into great detail about 
how a litigant could prove facts to challenge the validity of a statute. The 
Court noted that facts "beyond the sphere of judicial notice" could become 
part of the judicial inquiry.268 Additionally, "the constitutionality of a statute 
predicated upon the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged 
by showing to the court that those facts have ceased to exist."269 Further, the 
Court recognized that litigants within the purview of the statute could prove 
that their situation was "so different from others of the [regulated] class as to 
be without the reason for the prohibition."270 Thus, the Court in Carolene 
Products attempted to carve out the meaning of the deference principle by 
describing in great detail a method of evaluating the government's empirical 
evidence. 
 By defining deference in this way, the Court rejected the account of 
deference advocated in James Bradley Thayer's famous article, The Origin 
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and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law.271 According to 
Thayer, the Constitution was subject to a plurality of reasonable 
interpretations.272 The Court was not to serve as the primary interpreter of 
the Constitution; instead, the function of the judiciary was to discern 
whether the legislature's interpretation of the law was reasonable. "The 
judicial function," Thayer claimed, "is merely that of fixing the outside 
border of reasonable *992 legislative action."273  
 The Court did not adopt this method to carry out the deference principle, 
refusing to cede its role as primary interpreter of the Constitution. Deference 
applied only to the existence of facts supporting a law in question, not to the 
interpretation of the Constitution, which remained the province of the 
judiciary. As Henry Monaghan accurately observed, "The Court and the 
profession have treated the judicial duty as requiring independent judgment, 
not deference, when the decisive issue turns on the meaning of the 
constitutional text, and that specific conception of the judicial duty is now 
deeply engrained in our constitutional order."274 Deference to factual 
judgements rather than to constitutional interpretations appeared to be a 
much less radical approach than the deference advocated by Thayer. In this 
way, the Court could retain its role as primary interpreter of the Constitution 
while simultaneously maintaining a healthy deference for legislatures and 
other government institutions and officials. 
 The Court was well aware that facts influenced the meaning of the 
Constitution. To the extent that facts could shape the meaning of the 
Constitution, deference could be a partial relinquishment of the judiciary's 
role as primary interpreter. With the growing recognition that facts were a 
critical component to defining the meaning of the Constitution, this 
relinquishment threatened to be quite significant. The more the law-fact 
distinction became blurred, the more deference to fact (Carolene deference) 
became deference to law (Thayer deference). When writing Carolene 
Products, Justice Stone recognized that this posed a significant problem for 
the future of judicial review, prompting him to insert Footnote Four.275  
                         
271 7 HARV. L. REV. 129 (1893). 
272 See id. at 144 ("[T]he constitution often admits of different interpretations ... 
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273 Id. at 148. 
274 Monaghan, supra note 18, at 9. 
275 The full text of Footnote Four provides: 
    There may be narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality when legislation appears on its face to be within a specific 
prohibition of the Constitution, such as those of the first ten amendments, which are 
deemed equally specific when held to be embraced within the Fourteenth. 
    It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation which restricts those 
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 *993 Footnote Four presented itself as an exception to the presumption 
of  "the existence of facts supporting the legislative judgment."276 
Tentatively,277 the footnote explained that the deferential review ushered in 
by the Court in 1937 did not apply across-the-board to all constitutional 
rights. In contrast to Thayer's interpretation of deference, the Footnote 
argued for "a narrower scope for the operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality" and a "correspondingly more exacting judicial inquiry" 
when legislation implicates fundamental rights, affects the democratic 
processes, or discriminates against "discrete and insular minorities."278 
Footnote Four created a new regime of constitutional jurisprudence based 
upon a hierarchy of rights (fundamental vs. merely economic) and a 
corresponding dichotomy between methods of judicial review (deferential 
vs. heightened scrutiny).279 Justice Hughes added the first paragraph, 
suggesting that the Bill of Rights receive additional protection because these 
rights were explicitly mentioned in the Constitution.280  
 Like the rest of Carolene Products, Footnote Four was quite concerned 
with resolving how the Court was to handle empirical evidence in 
constitutional interpretation. Footnote Four recognized that the degree of 
scrutiny with which the Court reviewed the empirical basis for a law had 
                                                          
political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring about repeal of 
undesirable legislation, is to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under 
the general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are most other types of 
legislation. 
    Nor need we inquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of 
statutes directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities: whether 
prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which 
tends seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be 
relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more 
searching judicial inquiry. 
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. at 152 n.4 (citations omitted). 
276 Id. at 152. 
277 See J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 NW. U. L. REV. 275, 284 (1989) ("Indeed, not 
only do the most famous claims of Carolene Products appear in a lowly footnote, 
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280 See Louis Lusky, Footnote Redux: A Carolene Products  Reminiscence, 82 
COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1096 (1982). 
                                                    84 IOWA LAW REVIEW             [1999]                                         
profound effects for the ultimate result of the Court's decision about the 
constitutionality of the law. Thus, the Footnote suggested that certain rights 
deserved a greater degree of judicial protection than the deferential review 
ushered in by the New Deal. Unlike formalistic methods of the protection of 
constitutional rights, Footnote Four sought to protect rights by advocating a 
*994 method of increased critical scrutiny of empirical evidence. Footnote 
Four served as an alternative, an exception to deference consisting of a 
rigorous factual review. 
 Because it emphasized that empirical evidence (typically viewed as the 
domain of policy-makers) was an essential component of constitutional 
interpretation, textualists such as Justice Hugo Black were strongly critical 
of Footnote Four. In a letter to Chief Justice Stone, Black wrote: 
 
As I read the opinion in connection with the cases cited, it approves the 
submission of proof to a jury or a court under certain circumstances to 
determine whether the legislature was justified in the policy it adopted. This is 
contrary to my conception of the extent of judicial power of review.... In 
matters concerning policy I believe the right of final determination is with the 
Congress.281  
 
 Justice Black urged a formalistic approach to interpretation, one that 
looked to the plain meaning of text for stable foundations. He resisted 
Footnote Four's open emphasis on the importance of the Court's method of 
evaluating empirical evidence in interpretation. 
 Justice Stone's Footnote Four became the basis for a rift among New 
Deal liberals. Some, like Justice Frankfurter and Learned Hand, remained 
committed to keeping judicial review at bay. Frankfurter was especially 
antagonistic to Footnote Four. His hero was Thayer, who in Frankfurter's 
words, had written "the most important single essay regarding judicial 
review."282 According to Justice Frankfurter: 
 
[R]esponsibility for legislation lies with legislatures, answerable as they are 
directly to the people, and this Court's only and very narrow function is to 
determine whether within the broad grant of authority vested in legislatures 
they have exercised a judgment for which reasonable justification can be 
offered.283  
 
 Frankfurter was propounding the traditional New Deal response to 
judicial review, which had clashed with liberalism both procedurally and 
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substantively. Procedurally, judicial review enabled unelected Lochner-era 
Justices to frustrate the will of the majority. Substantively, *995 judicial 
review was used to impede the goals of New Deal liberalism. Other New 
Deal liberals, however, did not view judicial review as such an inherent 
threat to liberalism. Judicial review could be employed to promote 
substantive liberal values. They did not agree that majoritarianism was a 
sufficient procedural mechanism to maintain a democratic society. Indeed, 
the Warren Court illustrated that judicial review could be one of the most 
important instruments for furthering liberalism. 
 The Warren Court ensured that Footnote Four did not merely remain a 
footnoted exception to deference. Justice Frankfurter would write eloquent 
dissents, but his version of Thayer-like deference never won the day.284 In 
fact, Footnote Four blossomed into the modern judicial balancing approach 
to constitutional jurisprudence.285 Against the criticism of Frankfurter, 
Harlan, and Learned Hand, Footnote Four prevailed, confining deference to 
economic and property rights. The triumph of Footnote Four in cases 
involving fundamental constitutional rights, however, was not complete. An 
essential group of contexts remain in which deference continues to 
dominate. 
 
B. DEFERENCE AND THE BUREAUCRATIC STATE 
 
 Currently, under the Footnote Four paradigm, fundamental rights are 
protected by strict scrutiny. When fundamental rights arise in the contexts of 
the bureaucratic state, however, the deference principle remains the 
dominant force. Why does deference prevail in the bureaucratic state? Why 
does the Footnote Four paradigm not apply in the bureaucratic state? 
 The reason stems from prevailing New Deal conceptions of institutions 
and experts as superior evaluators of factual and empirical evidence. The 
bureaucratic state owes much of its development to Progressive and New 
Deal thinkers and politicians. The administrative state emerged when 
liberals started questioning the notion that negative liberty (i.e., freedom 
from government) was the essence of freedom and began recognizing that 
freedom required the active *996 assistance of government and its 
institutions.286 One of the central problems faced by progressives and New 
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Dealers was the growing power of private corporate bureaucracies. 
Liberalism in the early twentieth century became critical of capitalism, 
especially "concentrated economic power, the problem of 'monopoly."287 
Progressive and New Deal thinkers, viewing public bureaucracy as the 
solution to the ills of private bureaucracy, propounded complex regulatory 
schemes that involved the need to analyze vast amounts of empirical and 
factual data. To carry out these tasks, the proposed legislation created 
specialized government agencies, and the modern administrative state began 
to be assembled. 
 Many New Deal and progressive thinkers believed that the public expert 
was the solution to the private corporate power.288 They created public 
bureaucracies run by experts to respond to the growing power and influence 
of private bureaucracy. Roosevelt brought an unprecedented number of 
experts into government as part of his "Brain Trust." Early adherents of 
administrative process, such as James Landis, hailed administrative agencies 
for their expertise and specialization.289  
 Because of the centrality of institutions and experts to Progressive and 
New Deal liberalism, the judiciary during the 1940s and 1950s was faced 
with a difficult dilemma when reviewing rights involved in the contexts of 
the bureaucratic state: whether to vigorously protect individual rights as 
suggested by Footnote Four, or whether to maintain the special strengths of 
the growing bureaucratic state that New Deal liberalism had substantially 
helped set in motion. Cases involving the bureaucratic state were unusually 
difficult because they implicated the very heart of the New Deal revolution. 
 In West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,290 for example, 
the Court struck down a mandatory flag salute law in public schools in 
response to a challenge by Jehovah's Witnesses. "We cannot," the Court 
declared, "because of modest estimates of our competence in such 
specialties as public education, withhold the judgment that history 
authenticates as the function of this Court *997 when liberty is infringed."291 
In reaching this conclusion, the Court made a 180-degree turn in its 
jurisprudence. Just two years earlier, in Minersville v. Gobitis,292 the Court 
rendered a contrary decision on a very similar issue. Responding to the 
tumultuous and frightening events culminating in WWII, Barnette was 
painted in sweeping strokes. Much of the world was in the clutches of 
fascist, communist, and totalitarian governments that dramatically 
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emphasized the state over the individual. So far, the American experiment 
with public bureaucracy had not proven to be so grim. But with the political 
happenings throughout the world looming in their minds, how could the 
Court not be concerned? What made these times most alarming was the fact 
that it was often not merely through acts of physical force that these 
governments gained their power, but through the indoctrination and careful 
manipulation of the desires and passions of the people. 
 Barnette presented a stark invitation for the Court to consider America's 
future in light of the political events of the rest of the world. America was 
steadily heading toward greater state control over everyday life. With the 
blossoming of public education, state indoctrination of children appeared as 
a new and potentially dangerous form of power. Hitler had used the schools 
to promote Nazi propaganda; indeed, the flag salute in Barnette resembled 
the salute to Hitler.293 In an important passage, the Court cast the conflict as 
one between "authority" and the "right to self- determination."294 The Court 
recognized the importance of individual freedom in light of the growing 
power of state institutions throughout the world. 
 Barnette was part of a growing ambivalence of many liberals about the 
ability of public institutions to serve as a vehicle for achieving greater 
individual autonomy. New Deal liberals did not fully anticipate the 
overwhelming breadth of the contemporary bureaucratic state. The New 
Deal faith in expertise and government institutions came under its most 
profound challenge in the post-WWII period. The cold bureaucratic methods 
by which the Nazis carried out their exterminations in the Holocaust,295 and 
the rise of totalitarianism in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia,296 suggested 
*998 the frightening potential of large state institutions to abuse power. 
Many liberals who had trusted administrative experts during the New Deal 
became increasingly skeptical during the heyday of McCarthyism in the 
1950s.297 In 1954, Professor Jaffe, once a proponent of expertise theory, 
stated there was a "Great Disillusion" with the administrative state.298 The 
impact of these world developments was felt in the shifting focus of many 
liberals towards the importance of individual rights. Optimism over the 
ability of public bureaucracy to cope with the problems of private 
bureaucracy had waned. 
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 One of the hallmark decisions concerning the bureaucratic state was 
Brown v. Board of Education.299 The opinion was not merely about Equal 
Protection, but also about the pernicious effects of segregation within state 
institutions, such as its educational facilities. In Brown, the Court, relying in 
part on empirical evidence (social-scientific and psychological data), boldly 
analyzed the effects of state power exerted through its institutions on 
individuals.300 The Court made no mention of deference to legislative facts 
or to the judgment of state officials regarding segregated education. 
 Not all cases during this period recognized the new challenge to 
individual liberty in the burgeoning bureaucratic state. In several cases, the 
Court reasserted the deference principle, the most profound and tragic 
example being the Court's review of the Japanese internment. In 
Hirabayashi v. United States,301 the Court upheld a set of laws and 
regulations that imposed a curfew only against persons of Japanese ancestry 
who lived along the Pacific Coast. The issue before the Court was whether 
the curfew was a constitutional exercise of the "war power" of the Executive 
and Legislative Branches,302 extending "to every matter and activity so 
related to war as substantially to affect its conduct and progress."303 The 
Court examined two judgments in the decision to impose the curfew: (1) the 
"nature and extent of the threatened injury or danger"; and (2) "the selection 
of the means of resisting [the danger]."304 Although *999 Hirabayashi did 
not involve judicial balancing, these judgments appear quite similar to the 
elements of the judicial scrutiny balancing tests. The Court then articulated 
the deference principle: 
     
Where, as they did here, the conditions call for the exercise of judgment and 
discretion and for the choice and means by those branches of the Government 
on which the Constitution has placed the responsibility of war- making, it is not 
for any court to sit in review of the wisdom of their action or substitute its 
judgment for theirs.305  
 
 The Court first analyzed the nature and extent of the threatened danger. 
It described the attack on Pearl Harbor and Japan's aggression and 
determined that "reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility of 
our national defense had ample ground for concluding that they must face 
the danger of invasion [and] take measures against it."306 Here, the Court's 
                         
299 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
300 Id. at 495 n.11. 
301 320 U.S. 81 (1943). 
302 Id. at 92. 
303 Id. at 93. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. 
306 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94. 
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brief analysis of the factual situation led it to the conclusion that there was 
"ample ground" for the fear of invasion. 
 The remaining question was whether a "substantial basis" existed for 
believing the curfew was a "necessary" measure to combat the potential for 
sabotage and espionage--a question that rested on the weight of factual and 
empirical evidence.307 The Court observed that the Japanese immigrants 
were not well assimilated; that children born to Japanese alien parents were 
deemed by Japan as Japanese citizens; and that Japanese children were 
being sent to Japanese language schools "generally believed to be sources of 
Japanese nationalistic propaganda, cultivating allegiance to Japan."308 
Recognizing the uncertainty involved in predicting the extent of the danger 
of espionage and sabotage,309 the Court concluded that it could not "reject as 
unfounded the judgment of the military authorities and of Congress that 
there were disloyal members of that population, whose numbers and 
strength could not be precisely and quickly ascertained."310  
 Based on this analysis, the Court concluded that there was "a rational 
basis" to believe that such a substantial number of Japanese Americans were 
disloyal and likely to present a danger of espionage *1000 and sabotage that 
a curfew should be imposed on all Japanese-Americans.311 However, the 
Court's opinion contained no evaluation of these empirical claims.312 In 
contrast to Hirabayashi, which centered on the meaning and extent of the 
"war power," Korematsu v. United States313 focused on whether the 
exclusion of Japanese Americans from the West Coast violated their civil 
rights. The Korematsu Court, although applying "most rigid scrutiny,"314 
based its analysis on Hirabayshi's deferential factual analysis. The Court 
again concluded that the judgments of the military and Congress were not 
"unfounded."315  
 Thus, the Court's cases during the mid-twentieth century suggested 
vastly different approaches to the bureaucratic state. Brown and Barnette 
suggested a full recognition of the importance of protecting fundamental 
rights in the bureaucratic state. In contrast, cases such as Korematsu and 
Hirabayashi suggested that the Court should apply deference in these 
                         
307 See id. at 95. 
308 Id. at 97. 
309 Id. at 99. 
310 Id. 
311 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 102. 
312 Eugene Rostow's analysis of the Recommendations concludes that they merely 
recorded "conclusions, not evidence" and that they exhibited significant prejudice 
against the Japanese. See Eugene V. Rostow, The Japanese American Cases--A 
Disaster, 54 YALE L.J. 489, 520-21 (1945). 
313 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
314 Id. at 214. 
315 Id. at 218 (quoting Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 99). 
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contexts. 
 Deference prevailed. As new cases involving institutions arose, the 
Court began applying deference as a matter of course. The more insular the 
institution and the more exclusive the expertise of a particular 
decisionmaker, the more likely courts would apply deference. 
 One reason why deference became so prevalent in these contexts was 
because deference appeared to be a compromise position. With the late 
nineteenth century formalism, the courts decided cases more 
categorically--either a particular government law or regulation was subject 
to judicial review or it was a political question, not subject to judicial 
review. There was no theory, akin to judicial balancing, of varying degrees 
of scrutiny. Judicial review was an all-or-nothing affair. In post-Lochner-era 
jurisprudence, the judiciary had a third option other than full review or no 
review--the practice of deference. 
 When faced with new situations involving rights threatened by 
government institutions, courts often acted against a history of 
nonreviewability. The staggering growth in size and importance of 
government institutions such as schools, agencies, prisons, the military, 
*1001 and government workplaces during the twentieth century316 forced 
the judiciary to abandon its policy of nonreviewability.317 In the military, for 
example, the Court shifted from its position in Decatur v. Paulding,318 and 
Reaves v. Ainsworth,319 in which it declared that it had no power to review 
constitutional claims in the military to a recognition that "our citizens in 
uniform may not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed 
their civilian clothes."320 In the prisons, prior to the 1960s, the federal courts 
followed a "hands off" policy toward matters of prison administration 
regarding the treatment and rights of prisoners.321 As one court declared: 
                         
316 See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, surpa note 40, at 107-08. 
317 The Court's ineffective assistance doctrine also seems to parallel this shift. 
Before Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), the provision of defense counsel 
for indigent defendants was controlled at the state and local level. After Gideon, the 
competence of counsel was recognized as a constitutional right, and the Court, in 
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), declared that the effectiveness of 
counsel would be reviewed deferentially. In sum, like the military and prisons, there 
was a shift in terms of the recognition of rights, but a corresponding declaration of 
weak deferential review for these rights. 
318 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497 (1840). 
319 219 U.S. 296 (1911). 
320 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983) (quoting Earl Warren, The Bill of 
Rights and the Military, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 181, 188 (1962)). 
321 See, e.g., WILLIAM L. SELKE, PRISONS IN CRISIS 28-29 (1993); see also Note, 
Beyond the Ken of the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the 
Complaints of Convicts, 72 YALE L.J. 506 (1963) (critiquing the "hands off" 
doctrine). 
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"[I]t is not the function of the courts to superintend the treatment and 
discipline of prisoners in penitentiaries, but only to deliver from 
imprisonment those who are illegally confined."322 This approach, however, 
ended in the 1960s.323 As Justice Rehnquist observed in Bell v. Wolfish,324 
the federal judiciary abandoned the "hands off" doctrine because of the 
"deplorable conditions and Draconian restrictions of some of our Nation's 
prisons."325  
 Cruz v. Beto,326 the first prisoner Free Exercise case to reach the 
Supreme Court, vividly illustrates the shift from the "hands off" doctrine to 
deferential review. In Cruz, prison officials forbade a Buddhist prisoner 
from worshipping in the prison chapel and from talking to his religious 
advisor. After sharing his religious materials with other prisoners, prison 
officials locked him in solitary confinement for two weeks on a diet of only 
bread and water. The federal *1002 district court "denied relief without a 
hearing or any findings, saying that the complaint was in an area that should 
be left 'to the sound discretion of prison administrators."327 The Court, 
however, declared that the complaint should not be dismissed without a 
hearing. In so holding, the Court charted a middle path: "Federal courts sit 
not to supervise prisons but to enforce the constitutional rights of all 
'persons,' including prisoners."328  
 Thus, when the Court began to review rights affected by certain 
government institutions and officials, it attempted to protect constitutional 
rights in these contexts as well as avoid judicial intrusion into institutions 
and practices that it had traditionally left alone. The astounding growth of 
the bureaucratic state occasioned the need for the Court to adopt some sort 
of judicial review where there had previously been none. Rather than look to 
Footnote Four for guidance, the judiciary simply chose to apply deference. 
 The history of the development of deference illustrates that deference is 
only one particular way of embodying the deference principle in practice 
among numerous other possible methods. The current practice of deference 
is a twentieth century creation, and it only makes sense in the jurisprudential 
world that emerged after the demise of late nineteenth century formalism. 
Indeed, the practice of deference would not have made sense to the 
formalistic legal mind of the late nineteenth century because it emerged 
within the more empirical paradigm of constitutional interpretation that was 
shaped by the influence of pragmatism. The constitutional landscape of 
                         
322 Stroud v. Swope, 187 F.2d 850, 851-52 (9th Cir. 1951). 
323 See SELKE, surpa note 321, at 28-29. 
324 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
325 Id. at 562. 
326 405 U.S. 319 (1972). 
327 Id. at 321. 
328 Id. 
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judicial review around the turn of the century was governed by a dichotomy 
between political questions, outside the scope of judicial review, and issues 
that were within the scope of judicial review. This black-and-white 
dichotomy between full review and no review did not cause many 
difficulties in the early days of the Constitution because the bureaucratic 
state was still in gestation. There was no administrative state in the founding 
era. The prisons, the military, and the schools were vastly smaller in size and 
complexity than they are today. Because of the small size of the bureaucratic 
state, the protection of rights in this context was not even perceived as a 
problem. 
 The practice of deference emerged as an attempt by the Court to grapple 
with the complicated interplay between law and fact. When the bureaucratic 
state began its rapid growth, the newly-*1003 minted practice of deference 
permitted the Court to navigate the increasingly complex task of exercising 
judicial review in the contexts of the bureaucratic state. Deference enabled 
the Court to declare that the Constitution applied to the institutions of the 
bureaucratic state, and the Court often began deference opinions with 
rhetoric about the existence of rights in prisons, schools, the military, 
hospitals, the workplace, and other institutions. However, as illustrated in 
the next Part, deference has remained a woefully inadequate solution. 
 
IV. A CRITIQUE OF DEFERENCE 
 
 The genealogy of deference sketched in Part III illustrates that the 
embodiment of the deference principle in practice is historically contingent, 
shaped largely by the struggles of the Court during the Lochner era. The 
current practice of deference does not represent the inherent meaning of the 
deference principle, and the mere recitation of the principle is an insufficient 
justification for the practice. Therefore, it is necessary to explore how the 
current practice of deference is justified as the most appropriate embodiment 
of the deference principle. 
 This Part will examine and critique the justifications that legitimate the 
practice of deference as an appropriate embodiment of the deference 
principle.329 Underpinning these justifications is a conception of how the 
judiciary and government institutions evaluate factual and empirical 
evidence. I will argue that this conception, while quite compelling and 
accurate in many respects, contains errors, which, although subtle, are of 
profound consequence. 
 
A. THE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PRACTICE OF DEFERENCE 
 
                         
329 Throughout this Part, when speaking about the current practice of deference, I 
often refer to it simply as "deference" for the sake of readability. 
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 Before launching into a critique of deference, I will first present the 
prevailing justifications for deference in their strongest light. Deference is 
not justified systematically in one coherent document. Nevertheless, when 
viewed together, the epithets and various other statements in support of 
deference reveal an underlying conception of how the judiciary and 
government institutions evaluate factual and empirical evidence. 
 Almost all of the opinions involving deference depict judicial evaluation 
of factual judgments as an intrusion into the discretion *1004 of the officials 
and institutions under review. For example, in O'Lone v. Estate of 
Shabazz,330 the Court justified its deference to the judgments of prison 
officials concerning inmates' right to free exercise of religion as follows: 
 
This approach ensures the ability of corrections officials 'to anticipate 
security problems and to adopt innovative solutions to the intractable 
problems of prison administration,' and avoids unnecessary intrusion of the 
judiciary into problems particularly ill suited to 'resolution by decree.’331  
 
 In Youngberg v. Romero,332 the Court justified its deference to officials 
at state health institutions as minimizing "interference by the federal 
judiciary with the internal operations of these institutions."333 In Clark v. 
Community for Creative Non-Violence,334 the Court argued that it was 
deferring to the National Park Service because the judiciary lacked "the 
authority to replace the Park Service as manager of the Nation's parks."335 
According to the Court, factual judgments concerning the balance between 
preservation of park lands and the protection of free speech were within the 
discretion of the Park Service, and evaluating these judgments would usurp 
the authority of the Park Service officials. 
 Although not explicitly stated, these justifications for deference suggest 
that there is an overlap between the judgments made by the Court when 
engaging in judicial balancing and the judgments made by government 
officials when carrying out their responsibilities. Government officials need 
discretion in order to conduct good policymaking, experiment with creative 
solutions, and predict the efficacy and success of various decisions. The 
Court's language suggests that without deference, the Court would interfere 
with this important discretion of government officials. The image is of a 
bunch of naive judges meddling with matters they know little about: 
hampering good decisions, stifling creativity, and tyrannically imposing 
                         
330  482 U.S. 342 (1987). For a detailed discussion of O'Lone, see surpa Part II.A. 
331 O'Lone, 482 U.S. at 349-50 (citation omitted) (quoting  Procunier v. Martinez, 
416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974)). 
332 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
333 Id. at 322. 
334 468 U.S. 288 (1984). For a detailed discussion of Clark, see surpa Part II.A. 
335 Clark, 468 U.S. at 299. 
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their own unseasoned bookish ideas over the sound wisdom of experienced 
officials. The purpose of deference is to prevent judges from concocting 
their own "individual solutions" to difficult questions of policy that should 
be left to the appropriate experts and *1005 officials.336  
 Not only do the justifications for deference suggest that judicial scrutiny 
is in tension with the discretion of government officials, but they also go on 
to provide reasons why the discretion of officials is preferable to judicial 
scrutiny. Courts often argue that deference is appropriate because the 
judiciary is less competent than the decisionmaker under review in making 
particular factual determinations. This claim involves assumptions about the 
judiciary as well as the officials and institutions of the bureaucratic state. 
For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger,337 the Court, in deferring to the 
military and upholding a regulation that prohibited a Jewish military official 
from wearing a yarmulke, declared that judges are "illequipped to determine 
the impact upon discipline that any particular intrusion upon military 
authority might have."338 In Clark, the Court justified its deference on the 
ground that it lacked the "competence" of the Park Service to make the 
factual determinations necessary to determine whether the regulation was 
narrowly tailored.339 When evaluating a claim for selective prosecution, the 
Court justified its deference to prosecutorial discretion by recognizing that 
"the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such 
factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, 
the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the 
Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the 
kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake."340  
 According to these justifications, deference responds to the practical 
difficulties faced by the judiciary in the evaluation of complex empirical 
data. The Court recognizes that "the nature of the judicial process makes it 
an inappropriate forum for the determination of complex factual question of 
the kind so often involved in constitutional adjudication,"341 and thus, 
deference is the proper *1006 method of judicial review given the 
limitations of the judiciary. Further, the Court often contrasts the expertise 
of the officials under review to its own generalist and uninformed nature. 
                         
336 See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562 (1979). 
337 475 U.S. 503 (1986). For a detailed discussion of Goldman, see surpa Part II.A. 
338 Goldman, 475 U.S. at 507 (quoting Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 305 
(1983)). 
339 Clark, 468 U.S. at 299. 
340 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985). For similar justifications, see 
Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 407-08 (1989) ("[T]he judiciary is ill 
equipped to deal with the difficult and delicate problems of prison management."); 
Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 405 (1974) ( "[C]ourts are ill equipped to deal 
with the increasingly urgent problems of prison administration and reform."). 
341 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
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For example, in Youngberg v. Romeo,342 the Court applied deference to the 
decisions of "the judgment exercised by a qualified professional" concerning 
matters affecting the rights individuals involuntarily committed to 
government treatment facilities.343 The Court reasoned that a "professional" 
was "a person competent, whether by education, training or experience, to 
make the particular decision at issue."344 The Court deferred because "judges 
or juries are [not] better qualified than appropriate professionals in making 
such decisions."345 Deference, according to this reasoning, respects the 
judgments of those who are ensconced in the necessary empirical knowledge 
to make certain decisions. 
 Judges lack not only expert knowledge, but also the time and resources 
to review certain matters. As Justice Brennan wrote for the Court in Oregon 
v. Mitchell: 346  
 
The nature of the judicial process makes it an inappropriate forum for the 
determination of complex factual questions of the kind so often involved in 
constitutional adjudication. Courts, therefore, will overturn a legislative 
determination of a factual question only if the legislature's finding is so clearly 
wrong that it may be characterized as 'arbitrary,' 'irrational,' or 
'unreasonable.'347  
 
 The review of facts is time-consuming. Unlike legislatures and agencies, 
judges do not have years to amass the huge factual records. In today's highly 
fact- intensive legislation, the review of facts often involves scrutinizing a 
long and complex record--sometimes spanning hundreds of thousands of 
pages.348  
 Independent review of fact as a routine practice would prove impossible 
given the severe time constraints of the judicial process. In Bates & Guild 
Co. v. Payne,349 the Court in reviewing a classification decision by the 
Postmaster General under a particular statutory *1007 scheme, noted that 
although the issue of the classification was "largely one of law," the 
Postmaster's decisions should be reviewed deferentially: 
 
[W]e think his decision should not be made the subject of judicial 
investigation in every case where one of the parties thereto is dissatisfied. 
                         
342 457 U.S. 307 (1982). 
343 Id. at 322. 
344 Id. at 323 n.30. 
345 Id. at 323. 
346 400 U.S. 112 (1970). 
347 Id. at 248. 
348 E.g., Indus. Union Dep't, AFL-CIO v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 
(1980) (discussing agency record of 105,000 pages). 
349 194 U.S. 106 (1904). 
                                                    84 IOWA LAW REVIEW             [1999]                                         
The consequence of a different rule would be that the court might be 
flooded by appeals of this kind to review the decision of the Postmaster 
General in every individual instance.350  
 
 In an article written shortly after the birth of the constitutional and 
jurisdiction fact doctrines, Professor Dickinson observed that the reasoning 
underpinning these decisions would open a Pandora's box of litigation,351 
because it would be impossible for the Court to conduct de novo review of 
facts in every case where facts could affect the meaning of law. Today, in an 
age of judicial balancing, the Court does not have the time or resources to 
conduct a complete evaluation of all the facts implicating the judicial 
scrutiny formulas. As Kenneth Culp Davis has commented, the Supreme 
Court's independent judgments about facts--its own institutional processes 
for fact-finding and making factual judgments--often is shoddy and 
performed in an unsophisticated manner.352  
 Tragically, constitutional jurisprudence must be hammered out in terms 
of adjudication. Adjudication--its slow slugging along, overburdened 
judges, lack of specialized knowledge, and absence of efficient facilities for 
digesting and evaluating facts--seems like a weary dinosaur when contrasted 
with increasingly detailed technological data, vast quantities of complex and 
conflicting empirical studies, and bureaucratized, highly-specialized 
government institutions. 
 Finally, deference is justified by focusing on the difficulties of 
government officials in proving their factual conclusions. Courts justify 
deference by recognizing that data is often uncertain and ambiguous. 
Consider the following justification for deference to Congress: 
 
[C]ourts must accord substantial deference to the predictive judgments of 
Congress. Sound policymaking often requires legislators to forecast future 
events and to anticipate *1008 the likely impact of these events based on 
deductions and inferences for which complete empirical support may be 
unavailable. As an institution, moreover, Congress is far better equipped than 
the judiciary to 'amass and evaluate the vast amounts of data' bearing upon an 
issue as complex and dynamic as that presented here.353  
 
 Evidence is frequently contestable; experts often disagree. Many laws 
and regulations depend upon predictions, forecasts, and educated guesses. If 
government officials were forced to offer relatively unassailable scientific 
proof for their factual and empirical claims, most of their decisions would 
                         
350 Id. at 107-08. 
351 See Dickinson, surpa note 241, at 1060. 
352 See Davis, surpa note 155, at 940-41. 
353 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 665-66  (1994) (quoting Walters 
v. Nat'l Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 331 n.12 (1985)). 
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never survive judicial review.354  
 In many situations, government officials must act quickly or suffer 
disastrous consequences. In Hirabayashi v. United States,355 the dangers that 
the government sought to prevent--espionage and sabotage in a time of 
war--were quite severe. The Court described the situation as a "crisis of war 
and of threatened invasion."356 "The Constitution as a continuously 
operating charter of government," observed the Court, "does not demand the 
impossible or the impractical."357 In a balancing regime, rights cannot 
paralyze government from acting in exigent and dire circumstances; the Bill 
of Rights is not a "suicide pact."358 Justice Douglas, in his concurrence to 
Hirabayashi, pointed out the need for prompt government action: "Certainly 
we cannot say that those charged with the defense of the nation should have 
procrastinated until investigations and hearings were completed."359 Thus, 
deference is justified because sometimes the government must act quickly, 
and amassing adequate evidence to prove the need for its actions would take 
too much time. While rights must be protected, deference counsels that 
judges must be aware of the practical difficulties faced by government 
officials who have to make quick decisions with limited knowledge.*1009 
 Deference is a measure of new respect for this difficult position, 
granting some space for government officials to exercise their own 
judgment. Deference demonstrates an understanding that it is all too easy for 
the Court to look at government actions in hindsight and condemn them 
when they were in error. These hindsight attacks, however, will result in 
government paralysis in times of great urgency. The judiciary cannot 
continue to second-guess government officials from the safe perspective of 
hindsight because it would eviscerate the discretion of legislatures, agencies, 
and government decisionmakers. 
 
B. EVALUATING THE JUSTIFICATIONS 
 
 When the justifications for deference are viewed as a whole, it is 
apparent that they stem from a particular conception of how the judiciary 
                         
354 See FCC v. Nat'l Citizens Comm. for Broad., 436 U.S. 775, 814  (1978) (quoting 
FPC v. Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp., 365 U.S. 1, 29 (1961)) ("[C]omplete 
factual support in the record for the Commission's judgment or prediction is not 
possible or required; 'a forecast of the direction in which future public interest lies 
necessarily involves deductions based on the expert knowledge of the agency."). 
355 320 U.S. 81 (1943). For a detailed discussion of Hirabayashi, see surpa Part 
III.B. 
356 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 101. 
357 Id. at 104. 
358 See Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37  (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting). 
359 Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 107 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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and government institutions should evaluate factual and empirical evidence. 
Most critiques of deference talk past the justifications for deference and 
merely emphasize that it is an abdication of the judiciary's responsibility of 
engaging in judicial review. These critiques fail to address the justifications 
for deference directly because the conceptual model underpinning deference 
is quite compelling, and most of the legal academy subscribe to it in 
significant part. Yet the conception contains certain assumptions that are not 
adequately justified by experience and history. This section uncovers the 
assumptions underlying this conception and demonstrates their inaccuracies. 
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1. Focus on Practice Rather Than on Theory 
 
 The conception underpinning deference focuses almost exclusively on 
the practical difficulties with the practice of judicial review, rather than on 
the substance of the issues before the courts. The justifications for deference 
suggest that although certain liberal values are protected by the Constitution, 
the practical reality is that judicial review often is not a feasible and efficient 
way to protect them. Concerns of accuracy, efficiency, and feasibility 
dominate the discourse of deference. Liberal values are subordinated to the 
difficulties of process. What is lost is a guiding vision of democracy in 
evaluating the practical concerns of deference. These practical concerns are 
accompanied by an assumption that the adjudicatory process is a fixed 
material construct to be worked around rather than shaped and directed. It is 
certainly possible, however, not just to *1010 adapt to, but to transform, the 
material conditions of judicial institutions and the processes of adjudication. 
Unfortunately, liberal theories of judicial review fail to provide much 
guidance for reforming adjudication. Liberal theories of judicial review 
focus heavily on theoretical concerns over substantive rights but virtually 
ignore the practical difficulties of the adjudicatory process. The result is an 
alienation between practice and theory: the conceptual model legitimating 
deference focuses myopically on the problems of adjudication while liberal 
theories of judicial review afford scant theoretical attention to these 
problems. 
 
2. Static Conception of the Judiciary 
 
 The conceptual model underpinning deference assumes a particular 
interpretation of the judiciary's institutional nature, viewing the judiciary as 
competent to engage in legal reasoning but not competent to make 
complicated factual and empirical judgments. This model of the judiciary 
was originally sculpted during the New Deal and then fired in the kiln of 
legal process jurisprudence. Legal process jurisprudence, which flourished 
during the 1950s and 1960s, is named after Henry Hart and Albert Sacks's 
influential textbook, The Legal Process.360 According to William Eskridge 
and Philip Frickey, "The Legal Process was part of a larger collective effort 
                         
360 HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC 
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & 
Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). The Legal Process existed in manuscript form for 
most of its history and was published only recently. Bruce Ackerman declares that 
The Legal Process was "undoubtedly the most influential unpublished work in 
recent legal history." BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 38 
n.9 (1984). In addition to Hart and Sacks, thinkers in this school included Justice 
Frankfurter, Lon Fuller, Alexander Bickel and Herbert Weschler. 
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to synthesize the lessons of pre-war American law--the realist legacy of law 
as function and policy, the institutional competence idea central to the 
regulatory state, and the rationalist view of law as reasonable and 
coherent."361  
 One of the central ideas of the legal process school was the notion of  
"institutional competence"--that each institution had distinctive strengths 
and weaknesses in performing various functions in society.362 The concept 
of institutional competence originally *1011 emerged in Justice Brandeis' 
opinions.363 The legal process school developed this line of thought, 
examining the attributes and structures of legal institutions in order to 
determine the best institution to make certain political decisions. The 
underlying conception of the judiciary inherent in the application of 
deference is based on the institutional competence theories of legal process 
jurisprudence. These theories, however, have severe limitations. Process 
theorists focused rather narrowly on the existing realities of the institutions. 
The process discussion of institutional natures was advertised as a 
value-neutral assessment of empirical realities. As Bruce Ackerman 
observes, the process scholars looked to the "isolated blunders" made by 
institutions that courts were to point out and correct. Rarely did the process 
scholars explore the deeper structural or systemic failings of the institutions 
they described.364 They often spoke of institutions as if they had an inherent 
and unchanging nature, and their models of the bureaucratic and legislative 
process were often rather unsophisticated.365  
 Like its legal process foundations, the justifications for deference focus 
heavily upon the existing limitations of practice. Deference assumes a static 
model of adjudication, viewing its current difficulties as the inevitable 
consequences of an unchanging process. The practical attributes of 
institutions are accepted without sufficient critical inquiry. In sum, 
deference paints a stilted portrait of institutions; it focuses too heavily on the 
current characteristics of institutions rather than on their potential for reform 
                         
361 William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical 
Introduction to HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: 
BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW at li, c (William N. 
Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
362 E.g., Edward L. Rubin, The New Legal Process, the Synthesis of Discourse, and 
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363 See Eskridge & Frickey, surpa note 361, at ix. 
364 ACKERMAN, surpa note 360, at 39-40 (noting that mistakes of bureaucracies and 
legislatures are treated as isolated blunders, not systemic failures). 
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and change. Deference is justified only if one assumes a Burkean vision of 
the judiciary, one where material conditions regarding adjudication are rigid 
and unchanging. 
 
3. Unsophisticated Conception of Expertise and Institutions 
 
 Deference also depends upon certain assumptions about the superior 
ability of government institutions, officials, and experts to make factual 
judgments within their areas of specialty. These assumptions, *1012 
however, ignore the problems and constraints that experts and institutions 
face in making their judgments. 
 The glorification of the expert hearkens back to the New Deal era, when 
the New Dealers attempted to infuse new ideas and creativity into the realm 
of politics by bringing experts and academics into government. The most 
famous example of this practice was President Roosevelt's "Brain Trust," an 
inner circle of advisors composed largely of academics and scholars.366 This 
was a new and pragmatic response to the demands of government; it brought 
in fresh perspectives and knowledge, and it engaged experts and academics 
in the practical problems of the times. 
 Public bureaucracy and expertise, however, have not dealt with many of 
the problems the New Deal reformers hoped to curtail--especially, the 
growing powerlessness of individual's in a society dominated by large 
impersonal conglomerates of power. The New Dealers thought that 
government bureaucracy was the antidote to the growing corporate power; 
they failed to see that the problem was not caused by the private nature of 
corporate power, but the very bureaucratic structure itself, whether public or 
private. Today, public and private power have become unprecedentedly 
intermingled.367 Employees and officials frequently scuttle back and forth 
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between the public and private sectors. In short, the assumptions made by 
progressive and New Deal thinkers about the bureaucratic state that 
underpin deference are no longer adequate. 
 The problem with these assumptions is that they undermine the most 
important contribution of the judiciary to contemporary problems: critical 
inquiry. There are numerous deficiencies in bureaucratic *1013 expertise 
that go unrecognized in the justifications for deference. In the bureaucratic 
state, experts can become constrained in their vision by the needs of their 
institutions and by the existing practices of their fields. The expert 
judgments of agencies are often contorted by political needs; they are not 
always the product of an impartial analysis of factual data.368 Judgments 
made by military and prison officials are often based on longstanding 
customs and unanalyzed assumptions that have managed to escape critical 
scrutiny. Most judges see their role as testing the accuracy of expert opinion 
by holding it up against the prevailing customs of the expert community in a 
particular field. Unfortunately, many deficiencies in expert judgment occur 
because of the limitations in vision created by these longstanding customs. 
 Institutions also have their own customs, which can become rigid and 
adverse to change. Institutions have distinctive cultures and traditions. They 
also often possess an internal self-esteem and a strong instinct for survival. 
For example, branches of the military take elaborate steps to instill in their 
members, in addition to patriotism, a special pride in being part of a 
particular branch of the military. 
 A central reason why critical inquiry over expert decisions is necessary 
is that the expert rarely factors democratic liberal values into her decisions. 
Expertise tends to be narrowly focused and highly specialized, and the 
expert often does not make her judgments in light of democratic liberal 
values. As one judge explained: "Prison officials often do not feel that their 
primary obligation is the illumination or enforcement of constitutional 
rights. It is for this reason that our review cannot be passive."369 As Justice 
Marshall declared: 
 
The Court evidently assumes that the balance struck by officials is deserving of 
deference so long as it does not appear to be tainted by content discrimination. 
What the Court fails to recognize is that public officials have strong incentives 
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to overregulate even in the absence of an intent to censor particular views. This 
incentive stems from the fact that of the two groups whose interests officials 
must *1014 accommodate--on the one hand, the interests of the general public 
and, on the other, the interests of those who seek to use a particular forum for 
First Amendment activity--the political power of the former is likely to be far 
greater than that of the latter.370  
 
 "The Constitution," wrote Justice Brennan in his dissent in O'Lone, "was 
not adopted as a means of enhancing the efficiency with which government 
officials conduct their affairs, nor as a blueprint for ensuring sufficient 
reliance on administrative expertise. Rather, it was meant to provide a 
bulwark against infringements that might otherwise be justified as necessary 
expedients of governing."371 The specialized enclaves of expertise within the 
bureaucratic state often do not operate under a guiding vision of democratic 
liberal values. This is not to say that experts are not capable of developing 
such a vision; however, such an endeavor has not been adequately 
encouraged. In fact, in our age of increasing specialization, experts are 
taught just the opposite: to focus more exclusively on their specialties rather 
than on the larger societal implications of their decisions. 
 Contrary to the model that views expertise as neutral and impartial, the 
judgments of experts are just as susceptible to bias and discrimination as 
those made by non-experts. Although the expert is assumed to be a source of 
accurate impartial knowledge,372 facts are shaded by the values, 
assumptions, biases, and interests of the individuals who produce them. 
Sheila Jasanoff observes: "If legally relevant knowledge is always 
interest-laden, then the choice between alternative scientific accounts 
necessarily involves narrative, even political judgments. Willingness to 
accept a particular knowledge claim amounts to an expression of confidence 
in the institutions and practices that produced it."373 In Hirabayashi and 
Korematsu, the decisions of General DeWitt were quite prejudiced against 
the Japanese. When asked why similar measures were not being taken 
against the Italians and Germans, DeWitt answered: "You needn't worry 
about the Italians at all except in certain cases. Also, the same for the 
Germans except in individual cases. But we must worry about the Japanese 
all the time until he is [sic] wiped *1015 off the map."374  
 The bureaucratic state has amplified this problem because of the ease in 
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which prejudice can be concealed in the bureaucratic structure. As Michel 
Foucault has observed, throughout Western history, the exercise of state 
power has shifted from being conducted as an open spectacle demonstrating 
the might of the monarch to being executed in the hidden corridors of large 
institutions.375 Today, most of the government experts accorded deference 
are unelected officials, and there is often little public scrutiny of the internal 
workings of institutions. Decisions within government institutions often 
occur within the shadows, concealed from public view.376 Even when known 
to the public, many decisions of government officials concern localized 
matters or particular individuals, and are thus not likely to engender 
large-scale public responses. 
 Bureaucratic organizations often strive to eliminate discretion because 
of its potential for prejudice and unfairness. To do so, bureaucracy attempts 
to establish a set of air-tight procedures and methods for making decisions 
mechanical. Discretion, however, cannot be eliminated, no matter how 
routine and mechanized the procedures.377 Rather, discretion is shifted and 
hidden, exacerbating the problem by making discretion less transparent and 
open, and hence, more insulated from critical inquiry. In the bureaucratic 
state, institutional infringements on individual autonomy are often small and 
clandestine. Only when abuses are egregious do they capture public 
attention.378 These abuses are often so shocking that they are seen as isolated 
occurrences rather than the outward symptoms of institutions riddled with 
disease. 
 With deference, the judiciary gives inadequate attention to the *1016 
troubled history of certain institutions, many of which have been places of 
the unpardonable abuses and neglect. It was not too long ago that mental 
institutions were harrowing places of squalor and torture. Our prisons used 
to be, and in many cases still are, overcrowded, inhumane, and dangerously 
violent.379 In addition, prison administration was rampant with racism, as 
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manifested by widespread discrimination against Black Muslims during the 
1960s and early 1970s.380 In the schools under the regime of segregation, 
facilities for African-Americans were decrepit and woefully inadequate 
compared to those for whites. The ability of inhumane practices to flourish 
in these and other institutions in the past should serve as an impetus for 
further critical inquiry into the customs and practices of these institutions 
rather than the trusting, unskeptical attitude of deference. 
 Thus, facially neutral policies and the need for uniformity can hide 
potential discrimination and abuses of power. Although courts rarely peer 
beyond the surface of these policies, the mere existence of a uniform policy 
does not mean that an institution is treating everyone fairly. Discrimination 
often occurs through the use of facially neutral laws381 or uniform policies 
that fail to accommodate individuality and the special needs of certain 
minority groups. Cloaked in the garb of neutrality, these policies cover up 
their discretionary tracks. For example, in Goldman v. Weinberger,382 the 
Court was not concerned with the fact that the enforcement of the regulation 
against the rabbi in the Air Force appeared to be retaliatory. For eight years, 
he wore his yarmulke at all times. When he testified as a defense witness at 
a court-martial, the prosecutor filed a complaint with the Hospital 
Commander, stating that Goldman's wearing of his yarmulke violated an Air 
Force regulation. The Hospital Commander ordered Goldman not to wear 
the yarmulke outside the hospital, but after Goldman's attorney protested to 
the Air Force General Counsel, the Commander changed his order and 
prohibited *1017 Goldman from wearing his yarmulke at all times.383 
Goldman illustrates that bureaucratic rules and process often become a 
weapon wielded by officials for retaliation, favoritism, and bias. The 
Goldman Court, however, did not even address this issue. 
 Most often, of course, bureaucracy is not overtly discriminatory or 
abusive. However, it can still prove to be insidious to the autonomy of the 
individual. Bureaucracy often cannot provide adequate attention to the 
individual--not because government officials are malicious but because they 
are busy, face extreme stress, must act within strict time constraints, have 
limited training, and are often not encouraged (or even authorized) to 
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respond to idiosyncratic situations creatively. The bureaucratic state poses 
an ominous threat to liberal values because it becomes, as Max Weber 
observed, increasingly dehumanized and impersonal, striving to eliminate 
discretion, judgment, and individuation.384 Only at the highest levels, or in 
isolated compartments, does the necessary freedom and flexibility exist for 
significant individual creativity. 
 The individual is dwarfed by the large-scale considerations and 
longstanding standard processes of bureaucratic institutions. As John Dewey 
observed: "The tragedy of the 'lost individual' is due to the fact that while 
individuals are now caught up into a vast complex of associations, there is 
no harmonious and coherent reflection of the import of these conditions into 
the imaginative and emotional outlook on life."385 Bureaucracy has a way of 
mindlessly fitting people into a common mold, ignoring their idiosyncracies, 
failing to give due consideration to their needs, goals, and desires. The 
recent failure of efforts at accommodation for the free exercise of religion 
illustrates the problems of the bureaucratic state in permitting a wide range 
of freedom for individual beliefs.386 Indeed, most Free Exercise 
accommodation cases involve government institutions that refuse to make 
allowances in uniform regulations and laws for the beliefs *1018 of minority 
religious groups.387  
 With their ability to focus on individual cases, courts provide a needed 
dimension to the large-scale focus of bureaucracy. Adjudication permits 
analysis of the individual case; it allows for the making of policy at a highly 
individuated level--the exploration of a concrete instance where law affects 
an individual or an entity's rights. As John Dewey observed, it is the 
individual who serves as the source of change in institutions and customs: 
 
Every invention, every improvement in art, technological, military and 
                         
384 WEBER, surpa note 84, at 224. 
385 DEWEY, surpa note 174, at 81. 
386 I say "failure" because of the recent Supreme Court decision that invalidates the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-1 to -4 (1999). 
See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). RFRA had been passed in 
response to the Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872 (1990), in which the Court refused to apply strict scrutiny to protect 
religious liberties under the Free Exercise Clause. See id. at 890. Without RFRA, 
Free Exercise rights fall back into the regime created by Smith, which provides a 
very minimal protection for religious liberty. 
387 See, e.g., Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872  (1990) (concerning 
government employment); O'Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987) 
(concerning prisons); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 
141 (1987) (concerning unemployment system); Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 
503 (1986) (concerning military); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) 
(concerning schools). 
THE DARKEST DOMAIN                                                                               
political, has its genesis in the observation and ingenuity of a particular 
innovator. All utensils, traps, tools, weapons, stories, prove that some one 
exercised at sometime initiative in deviating from customary models and 
standards. Accident played its part; but some one had to observe and utilize the 
accidental change before a new tool and custom emerged.388  
 
 Courts can force bureaucracies to focus more on the individual 
perspective. Biased towards the abstract and systematic, bureaucracy 
concerns itself with masses of empirical data and general broadly-applicable 
policies. A common assumption is that empirical data must be abstract and 
systematic in order to be useful. The immediate single experiences are 
ignored in this bias toward vastness. Individual stories and anecdotal 
evidence, however, are quite important. Indeed, much can be learned from 
the individual experience--much that is ignored by the statistician. By 
looking beyond this faceless data to particular individual situations, courts 
can observe new potentialities for improvement and become aware of 
unforeseen problems. Ironically, it is often not reams of data and empirical 
evidence that inspire pathbreaking discoveries and reforms, but inspiration 
from individual experiences. 
 In the contexts of the bureaucratic state, the courts can initiate an effort 
to make institutions more democratic and humane, to force officials to base 
their policies on the best empirical research of the day, to be guided by 
democratic values, to be more humble and skeptical of their own practices, 
and to continually look to individual *1019 cases as well as to the big 
picture to form regulation. The judiciary is not the only instrument that can 
effect this change, but it is a powerful one. The conception of the judiciary 
that underpins deference, however, overlooks these difficulties of 
bureaucratic expertise and ignores the positive potential of the judiciary. As 
a result, this conception fails to provide a balanced and nuanced account of 
the relative competence of the judiciary vis-a-vis bureaucratic institutions in 
the evaluation of factual evidence. 
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4. Conflation of Critique with Creation 
 
 The most critical flaw in the conception that underpins deference is the 
assumption that evaluating factual judgments invades the discretion of the 
decisionmaker under review. The assumption is that in the realm of policy, 
critique is tantamount to creation. The conception that underpins deference 
assumes an inherent conflict between judicial review and the discretion of 
government officials. In other words, it assumes that judicial review of a 
particular decision is equivalent to making that decision in the first instance. 
A significant distinction, however, can be made between the evaluation and 
creation of policy. While evaluation involves examining the wisdom of 
policies to some extent, it does not entail a wholescale replacement of 
judgment. Critique is not the same as authorship; rather, it is a process of 
interacting with a pre-existing judgment, of pointing out unanswered 
questions and deficiencies in reasoning. 
 The assumption that meaningful critical inquiry is tantamount to an 
invasion of discretion is founded on the improper association of critical 
inquiry with Lochnerism. The Lochner Court barely engaged in a critical 
analysis of the facts supporting the necessity of the hour restriction for 
bakers; instead, it just made the conclusory statement that there were none. 
This is not critical inquiry. Ideally, critical inquiry does not impose a fixed 
canon of beliefs and principles on the judgments under review; rather, it is 
process of openminded exploration. Critical inquiry does not have to be a 
stifling skepticism, one that annihilates all laws and policies in its presence. 
Notwithstanding the deference he advocated, Justice Brandeis displayed a 
sophistication in analyzing facts that serves as a good example of how the 
Court should have approached New Deal legislation.389 Thus, the deference 
principle--that judges should refrain from injecting their own personal 
ideologies into their constitutional interpretation--is quite compatible with 
critical inquiry. Courts can *1020 remain critical without substituting their 
judgment for that of experts and officials. Courts can be sensitive to the 
needs of officials and institutions while simultaneously engaging in a 
vigorous critical inquiry into their judgments. Experts serve as a wonderful 
resource in the process of critical inquiry because they are enmeshed in the 
actual practical difficulties of institutions, steeped in the facts, and 
constantly aware of the needs and concerns of practice. Nevertheless, courts 
must remain critical of the expert. Courts should prevent experts and 
institutions from cloistering themselves from the rest of the world, keeping 
their fields insular and impenetrable. Courts should force experts to engage 
in a dialogue with the nonexperts. Judges must remain wary of blind 
acceptance of authority and subject everything to constant critical inquiry. 
 Deference is the negation of critical inquiry. Deference assumes that 
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judicial review via critical inquiry into empirical evidence is equivalent to 
judicial legislation and the imposition of judicial ideology. By making this 
equivalency, critical inquiry of facts is banished from judicial review. 
Deferential review merely becomes a form of additional legitimacy, a 
judicial stamp of approval for the decisions made by government officials in 
the bureaucratic state.390  
 
V. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL REVIEW WITHOUT DEFERENCE? 
 
 Can the existing practice of deference be abandoned? The conception 
that justifies deference is certainly accurate in some respects. In its current 
form, the adjudicatory process provides far from an efficient and capable 
method for judges to engage in sound critical analysis of the laws and 
policies of the bureaucratic state. Given the existing practices and structures 
of the judicial process, judicial review as critical inquiry would be quite 
difficult to achieve in practice. In order to achieve judicial review as critical 
inquiry, the processes of constitutional adjudication must be transformed. 
Theorists of judicial review should turn to examining creative methods of 
evaluating empirical evidence. The answer is not to repudiate the deference 
principle, but to abandon the practice of deference currently associated with 
the principle and to transform judicial review so that it more adequately 
deals with facts. 
 Judicial balancing is a vast improvement in constitutional adjudication 
over late nineteenth century formalism. In its virtues, *1021 judicial 
balancing conceives of law as an instrument to achieve human purposes, not 
as an end unto itself; it remains deeply concerned with the consequences of 
laws; and it assesses each situation as it arises rather than categorically 
restricting the exercise of state power in the name of absolute rights. With its 
greater focus on empirical evidence in issues of constitutional interpretation, 
it brings law more in tune with contemporary science, social science, 
economics, and other fields of human knowledge. 
 Judicial balancing, however, remains primitive in its analysis of facts. 
Too many instances of constitutional interpretation--especially ones under a 
balancing approach--fail to adequately explore and develop the facts. 
Judicial balancing often is not a detailed exploration into a problem, but an 
attempt by overworked judges to guess, hypothesize, and make policy from 
untested assumptions about the facts. While science and other fields advance 
by careful study of factual and empirical data, by constant experimentation 
and critical review, modern judicial review does not even begin to approach 
the task of fact-finding with any degree of sophistication. All too often, 
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judicial review is exercised as it was in Lochner, even in strict scrutiny 
cases, very little scrutiny actually goes on. Very often, the Court quickly 
strikes down a law without giving careful attention to the facts. The heart of 
the problem lies in a lack of methods and techniques of critical inquiry. This 
occurs not just in cases of deference, but in instances of heightened scrutiny 
as well. It is a problem that runs throughout judicial review. 
 Liberal theorists of judicial review should turn to the practical problems 
of the adjudicatory process. Instead of ignoring the justifications for 
deference, liberal theorists should engage them by exploring the 
potentialities and possibilities of the judiciary and by charting a course of 
systematic change. In addition, Congress must also become involved in 
working on these reforms. Lack of time and resources severely hampers 
most judges, and many of the tools necessary to grapple with these 
constraints are in the hands of the Legislative Branch. The time is long 
overdue for Congress to look to the topic of refashioning the adjudicatory 
process so that it is more capable of dealing with the complex problems it 
will face in the twenty-first century. 
 The judiciary must also become actively involved in this endeavor. 
Although the Constitution is mostly silent on how cases ought to be tried, 
leaving much room for the judiciary to shape and alter the future of 
adjudication, fairly little has been done to reform the customs and 
techniques of adjudication. Change does not have *1022 to begin at the 
systemic level, as a massive all- or-nothing revamping of the entire structure 
of the judiciary. Meaningful change can occur quite rapidly if it is fostered 
in an attitude of pragmatic experimentalism. Individual judges can 
spearhead these efforts. Meaningful change does not require the unified 
action of the entire judiciary; it can begin with a small number of visionary 
and creative judges. For example, Justices Marshall, Cardozo, and Holmes 
each in their own way exerted a profound influence on the law, more than 
legions of other judges combined. Indeed, a single judge possesses the 
power to achieve lasting change--it takes only courage and creativity. Judge 
Learned Hand was among the first judges to hire law clerks. His idea was so 
bold and original that he initially experienced difficulty with finding clerks, 
and he even had to pay them out of his own pocket.391 It is this type of 
innovation and creativity that is necessary to achieve a pragmatic 
reconstruction of judicial review. 
 The judiciary must take steps to transform itself so that it can engage in 
a thorough critical inquiry into the complex empirical issues surrounding 
decisions made by experts in the bureaucratic state. To make such an 
inquiry, judges do not have to become social scientists. Critical inquiry into 
factual and empirical judgments does not mean number-crunching or 
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pouring over reams of data. Rather, it is a process of intelligent inquiry into 
the facts. It is developing methods of evaluation, of testing data, and of 
interacting with experience. 
 To better engage in such a critical inquiry, judges must enhance their 
experience. The judicial office is conceived as a bookish domain, where 
judges sit quietly beside tomes of law books in their cloistered chambers. In 
contrast, judges should constantly strive to enrich their experience--through 
literature and through lived experiences. Judges should expand the 
traditional methods of learning about a matter--which often occurs through 
court briefs and testimony. They should actually go to the institutions that 
they review--they should study them and learn about them. Judges could 
greatly enrich their perspective if they actually visited the schools, the 
prisons, the military, the mental hospitals, and other such institutions. There 
are numerous structural changes that judges can achieve: using magistrates 
and special masters in creative ways, requiring attorneys to develop different 
types of information not typically supplied in the adjudicatory process, and 
seeking the input of independent experts. 
 *1023 Another aspect of adjudication can be modified--namely, the 
current finality of judicial decisions. In an age of balancing, instances of 
constitutional interpretation still remain a one-shot enterprise. Courts, 
especially the Supreme Court, address a specific issue in a specific case and 
then rarely follow up in that case. Occasionally, courts will revisit an issue 
in a similar case, but often, judicial balancings are final. Once the court 
decides, the litigants and the problem disappear from its attention. Existing 
adjudicatory practices do not permit sufficient opportunities for judges to 
examine the consequences of their decisions. This is problematic, because it 
shuts the courts off from the world in which their decisions take effect. The 
judiciary is often perceived as distant from the needs and concerns of 
modern institutions, almost oblivious to the consequences. Part of the 
problem with bureaucracy is that it tends to cut off the decisionmaker from 
the consequences of her actions, and unfortunately, courts also exhibit this 
tendency. 
 In sum, I am suggesting that the judiciary reform itself--beginning at the 
level of individual judges--to improve its ability to evaluate empirical 
evidence. Judges must think about the judicial branch--as Justice Marshall 
once thought about it--and how it can be transformed through their own 
actions. Justice Marshall transformed the judiciary through his opinions, 
achieving profound theoretical and structural changes in the judiciary as an 
institution. But today, judges often do not think in this manner. Many act as 
if judicial review is a fixed practice and as if the structure of the judiciary is 
an immutable reality. It is time for judges and scholars to begin to think 
creatively about the problems of judicial review in the bureaucratic state 
rather than continuing to retreat to the practice of deference. 
 
